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COPYRIGHT’S DEPRIVATIONS
Anne-Marie Carstens*
Abstract: This Article challenges the constitutionality of a copyright infringement remedy
provided in federal copyright law: courts can order the destruction or other permanent
deprivation of personal property based on its mere capacity to serve as a vehicle for
infringement. This deprivation remedy requires no showing of actual nexus to the litigated
infringement, no finding of willfulness, and no showing that the property’s infringing uses
comprise the significant or predominant uses. These striking deficits stem from a historical
fiction that viewed a tool of infringement, such as a printing plate, as the functional equivalent
of an infringing copy itself. Today, though, the remedy more likely reaches modern “dual-use”
property that might be used partly, predominantly, or even exclusively for lawful uses, from
computers to manufacturing equipment. The risk of constitutional violation is particularly
acute in the Second and Ninth Circuits, where copyright suits predominate and where cases in
recent years give cause for greater concern. In high-profile parallel actions in New York and
California, for example, the Second Circuit rejected a sound engineer’s plea for return of
equipment, computers, and hard drives that he argued were never used for infringement and
contained unrelated, highly personal content, including irreplaceable family photos. The
federal district court in a similar action in California held that the Ninth Circuit required the
same.
After scouring the history of this remedies provision, whose origins predate the Bill of
Rights, this Article argues that this much-mutated remedy can run afoul of the
Fifth Amendment because it is based on a historical fiction that has lost its force. Most notably,
it can lead to an unconstitutionally arbitrary or excessive award that violates due process, and
it might also rise to an unconstitutional taking of personal property. This Article maintains that
courts can sidestep these constitutional landmines by making predicate findings of actual
nexus, willfulness, and significant or substantial use to commit the infringement at issue.
Moreover, reviewing courts should consistently review such orders de novo as a further
safeguard against the risk of unconstitutional property deprivations.
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INTRODUCTION
Federal copyright law provides a remedy that permits courts to order
the destruction or other permanent deprivation of private property—
property that can go far beyond the infringing copies themselves—in civil
copyright infringement suits between private litigants. In particular, the
court may order the destruction or other disposition of personal property
“by means of which” infringing copies “may be reproduced.”1 Both the
statutory text and the case law make clear that the mere capacity of such
property for infringing uses makes it susceptible to permanent deprivation
pursuant to this remedy. Moreover, courts do not employ the canon of
ejusdem generis to limit such deprivations to the examples or kin provided

1. 17 U.S.C. § 503.
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in the statute,2 which refers to “plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes,
film negatives, or other articles” that can be used to infringe.3 Courts
instead interpret the remedy to apply more broadly to equipment,
machines, computers, and other apparatus that can serve as a vehicle for
infringement but that also prove capable of non-infringing uses. So, query:
Can such permanent deprivations of private property pursuant to this
deprivation remedy run afoul of the Fifth Amendment?4
The severity of the Copyright Act’s5 deprivation remedy and the
stunning array of private property that falls within its ambit6 prompt this
vexing and unexplored question about the remedy’s constitutionality.
Courts have considered whether the corresponding impoundment
provision violates the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable
searches and seizures.7 But they have left untouched whether the
2. See, e.g., Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114–15 (2001) (noting that applying the
statutory canon of ejusdem generis means that “[w]here general words follow specific words in a
statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to
those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words” (quoting 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 (1991))).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1)(B). The provision specifically provides that courts can order the
impoundment, destruction, or other disposition of “plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, film
negatives, or other articles by means of which such copies of phonorecords may be reproduced.” Id.
The Copyright Act refers specifically to infringing “copies or phonorecords” because sound
recordings did not traditionally obtain copyright protection. Id. For ease of use, “copies” is used herein
to encompass both “copies” and “phonorecords.” See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “copies” and
“phonorecords”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 n.11 (1984)
(noting that the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971 aimed to solve “the ‘record piracy’ problems
that had been created by the development of the audio tape recorder”).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation”).
5. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1511.
6. Id. § 503.
7. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231,
1263 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (stating that the Fourth Amendment governs “seizure orders directing the
United States Marshal to impound allegedly infringing articles under the Copyright Act” (quoting
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Doe, 821 F. Supp. 82, 90 (E.D.N.Y. 1993))); Time Warner Ent. Co. v.
Does Nos. 1–2, 876 F. Supp. 407, 413 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (observing that copyright holders’ proposed
order to allow their agents to seize and impound infringing articles in a “roving search” does “not
come close to the particularity required by the Fourth Amendment”); Paramount Pictures Corp., 821
F. Supp. at 90–91 (holding that copyright holders’ requested order for “roving warrant” to seize
infringing articles would violate Fourth Amendment); see also Annemarie Bridy, Three Notice
Failures in Copyright Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 777, 806 (2016) [hereinafter Bridy, Three Notice
Failures] (stating that “[e]x parte domain name seizures [in copyright cases] present amplified due
process problems because they can have massive secondary effects, as when a seized domain name
belongs to a public cyberlocker service that hosts the digital property of millions or tens of millions
of users from all over the world”); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 13.1.3.1 (3d ed.
2005) (noting that the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressed
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deprivation remedy effects a permanent deprivation of personal property
that implicates the Fifth Amendment, which bars both deprivations of
property “without due process of law” and improper government takings
of personal property for public use.8
Not all deprivations occasioned by the deprivation remedy pose
constitutional problems. The usual and most obvious targets of the
deprivation remedy are materially identical, so-called direct copies.9
When applied strictly and exclusively to this category of pirated copies,
bootlegs, and counterfeits,10 the remedy causes no affront to the hallowed
“serious doubts” about whether ex parte seizure procedures under previous copyright rules comported
with the Fourth Amendment); 6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 22:85 (“Very serious
issues, including violation of the Fourth Amendment, are raised when the relief sought is ex parte
seizure of property from private establishments.”); Paul S. Owens, Impoundment Procedures Under
the Copyright Act: The Constitutional Infirmities, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 211, 239, 243 (1985))
(observing that items to be seized pursuant to writ of seizure in copyright actions “are frequently
described in terms more general than would be allowed in criminal infringement actions, particularly
where piracy is suspected” (citation omitted)).
In Religious Technology Center, two Scientology-affiliated organizations alleged that a former
Scientology minister infringed by posting copyrighted works on the internet. 923 F. Supp. at 1239.
Law enforcement officers executing a writ of seizure entered the defendant’s home with plaintiff’s
experts, who “aided in the search and seizure of documents related to [the defendant’s] alleged
copyright infringement” and, according to the defendant, “in fact directed the seizure.” Id. at 1240.
The defendant claimed the “plaintiffs seized books, working papers, and personal papers” in addition
to seizing “computer disks and cop[ying] portions of [the defendant’s] hard disk drive onto floppy
disks and then eras[ing] the originals from the hard drive.” Id. On review, the court held that the writ
of seizure was overbroad because it allowed for seizure of non-infringing items. The court therefore
vacated the writ and ordered that all articles seized be returned to the defendant. Id. at 1264–65. The
Advisory Committee specifically cited this case in revising Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to make its procedural safeguards applicable to copyright impoundments. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 65 advisory committee’s note to 2001 amendment.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies to federal
government action, as here. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942) (“Due process of law is secured
against invasion by the federal Government by the Fifth Amendment and is safeguarded against state
action in identical words by the Fourteenth.”). Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1976, and federal
courts possess original and exclusive jurisdiction over suits arising under the Copyright Act. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a).
9. See, e.g., Crim. Prods., Inc. v. Turchin, No. 3:16-cv-1695-AC, 2017 WL 979099, at *3 (D. Or.
Mar. 14, 2017) (ordering the defendant “to destroy all unauthorized copies of Plaintiffs’ motion
pictures”); Evony, LLC v. Holland, No. 2:11-cv-00064, 2011 WL 1230405, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31,
2011) (ordering the defendant “to deliver to Plaintiffs . . . for destruction” all copies of the infringing
video game and other infringing materials); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Stewart, 461 F. Supp. 2d 837,
845 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (“Defendant also shall destroy all copies of Plaintiffs’ Recordings that Defendant
has downloaded onto any computer hard drive or server without Plaintiffs’ authorization and shall
destroy all copies of those downloaded recordings transferred onto any physical medium or device in
Defendant’s possession, custody, or control.”); Peer Int’l Corp. v. Luna Recs., 887 F. Supp. 560, 570
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (Justice Sotomayor, then a district judge, granted the plaintiff’s request “that all
infringing copies and materials in [the defendant’s] possession be destroyed.”); see also 17 U.S.C.
§ 603(c) (forfeiture and destruction of infringing copies unlawfully imported into the United States).
10. These undefined terms have understood meanings in the copyright context. The Agreement on
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Due Process or Takings doctrines. The longstanding practice of
destroying infringing copies harkens back to a federal copyright law11 that
predated and survived the Bill of Rights and its Fifth Amendment.
Moreover, in such instances, the government deprives infringers of
property in which they could have no title under law,12 and so have lost
no legally cognizable property interest. This premise stands firmly
grounded in background principles of law and is both unremarkable and
universal enough to be enshrined in the relevant international copyright
treaties that apply the world over.13
The broad language of the deprivation remedy, however, barrels past
this premise and facilitates potentially troublesome Due Process Clause
and Takings Clause violations when applied to other categories of
property. Dual-use items—property that does not constitute an infringing
copy itself but is capable of both infringing and non-infringing uses—
prove particularly susceptible. As expanded in the legislative overhaul
that culminated in the current law, the Copyright Act of 1976,14 the
remedy can ensnare dual-use property having only a de minimis nexus to
infringement or no direct nexus at all. For example, a court could invoke
the remedy to order the destruction or turn-over of a piano on which an
infringing work has been performed or may be performed or a computer
that has been used or may be used to upload an infringing video to

Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) defines a “pirated copy”
generally as an unauthorized copy “made directly or indirectly from an article where the making of
that copy would have constituted an infringement of a copyright or a related right” under a country’s
domestic law. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 51 n.14, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. A “bootleg” refers specifically to a sound or video
recording made from a live musical performance that has been copied into a tangible form, in violation
of 17 U.S.C. § 1101, governing the unauthorized fixation and trafficking in sound recordings and
music videos. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A. A “counterfeit” item is an infringing copy passed off as an authentic
original in both content and packaging. To help cut down on counterfeiting, separate provisions
criminalize trafficking in counterfeit or illicit labels or in counterfeit documentation or packaging for
copyrighted works. 18 U.S.C. § 2318.
11. Copyright Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-15, 1 Stat. 124; see also infra section I.A.
12. See, e.g., Morrison v. Pettibone, 87 F. 330, 332 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1897) (holding “that the act of
congress, clearly intending to give to the proprietor an exclusive right of property in that which has
been produced by his mind and skill, confers as well an ownership in all copies which are made by
infringers; that through the act of piracy the title to the imitation vests in the proprietor of the
copyright”).
13. E.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art 16(1), Sept. 9,
1886, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (as amended on Sept. 28, 1979) (“Infringing copies of a work shall be liable
to seizure in any country of the Union where the work enjoys legal protection.”); TRIPS Agreement,
supra note 10, at art. 9(1) (requiring WTO Members to comply with the substantive articles 1–21 of
the Berne Convention, except article 6bis governing moral rights).
14. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810).
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YouTube.15 In his seven-volume treatise on copyright law, Patry noted a
“surprising lack of concern” for such issues during the legislative drafting
of the provision.16
The risk grows when courts adopt the statutory language wholesale,
leaving the affected party to decide on its scope (and face possible
contempt for deciding in favor of under-breadth). The risk of
constitutional conflict also increases when courts prove unwilling to tailor
the remedy to the infringement, as both the Second and Ninth Circuits
have shown themselves inclined to do.
The Second Circuit, for example, expressly confirmed a reading of the
deprivation remedy that excluded any requirement of nexus to the litigated
infringement in a high-profile dispute between Jay-Z, his record label, and
his former studio sound engineer, Chauncey Mahan.17 After Mahan lost
an infringement action to Jay-Z and the label, Roc-A-Fella Records, the
engineer appealed the court’s deprivation order.18 The order deprived him
of a storage unit’s worth of disks, CDs, cartridges, computers, hard drives,
and an audio player, all of which had been seized by Los Angeles police
officers from Mahan’s Los Angeles storage locker prior to the litigation.19
Among other arguments, the sound engineer maintained that the district
court had made “no findings” that his main equipment had ever been used
to create or distribute any infringing copies of the record label’s
recordings. In fact, he stressed that the computers and hard drives
contained unrelated, “irreplaceable” content, including “sentimental
videos, photos, materials and documentation” of his children’s births and
their first words and steps, as well as videos and photos of deceased family
15. 17 U.S.C. § 503(b); see also infra section I.C.
16. As specific examples, Patry noted that the drafters seemed unconcerned with whether the
deprivation remedy would apply to “dual-use items, like photocopy machines” or “a piano that is used
to perform an unlicensed song or all the instruments in a band playing at an unlicensed club.” PATRY,
supra note 7, § 22:84; see also Marc Alexander, Discretionary Power to Impound and Destroy
Infringing Articles: An Historical Perspective, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 479, 490 (1982)
(observing that the legislative history “addressed, without resolving, the issue of whether means used
to produce infringing items which were also capable of non-infringing uses could be impounded and
destroyed”).
17. Mahan v. Roc Nation, LLC, 720 F. App’x 55 (2d Cir. 2018).
18. Id.
19. See Opinion and Order at *2, Mahan v. Roc Nation, LLC, No. 14 Civ. 5075(LGS), 2015 WL
1782095 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2015), aff’d, 634 F. App’x 329 (2d Cir. 2016); see also Order Granting
Motions to Dismiss at *2, Mahan v. Perez, No. 16-cv-02024-JST, 2016 WL 7048997 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
5, 2016) (noting that a lawyer representing Roc Nation met Mahan at Mahan’s storage unit, cataloged
the contents, then called the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), which then seized the media
contents from the unit). According to Mahan, Roc Nation’s attorney “placed his own name on the
property receipt form issued by the LAPD, as if Roc Nation was the true rightful possessor of the
chattel[s].” Complaint at 13, Mahan v. Perez, No. CV16-2024-JST, 2016 WL 7048997 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 18, 2016).

Carstens (Do Not Delete)

2021]

11/21/21 4:07 PM

COPYRIGHT’S DEPRIVATIONS

1281

members.20
In the appeal, the Second Circuit disregarded that the order permitted
the permanent deprivation of personal property that might bear no
relationship to the complained-of infringement. Instead, the court swiftly
dismissed the challenge in a Summary Order.21 According to the court,
the prevailing party “did not have to prove that copyright infringement
had already occurred” with respect to the items because “[t]he statute
permits the court to order the reasonable disposition of property ‘by means
of which such copies or phonorecords may be reproduced.’”22
This cursory assertion is both alarming and striking. Although the
Second Circuit Rules provide that a Summary Order does not have
precedential effect, the court’s decision to resolve the issue without
additional inquiry or explanation itself reflects that the court was
unbothered by this outcome or broad reading of the statutory language.23
Moreover, it reached this conclusion in the absence of any well-reasoned
opinion below.
Even more, the underlying events spanned both coasts, and a federal
district court in California held (in a related action against different
defendants) that the Ninth Circuit commanded a similar conclusion.24
Mahan had again sought to challenge the confiscation and recover the
property by filing the action in California against representatives of the
record label and several Los Angeles police officers, all of whom Mahan
alleged were responsible for the “illegal” confiscation of his property.25
The district court observed that the case centered on “nearly identical”
facts as the New York action, and it therefore dismissed the complaint on
preclusion grounds.26
In reaching this conclusion, though, the California district court
observed that the New York federal courts had resolved the question of
ownership of the property in favor of the record label, thereby precluding
relitigation of Mahan’s allegation that the property had been “illegally
confiscated.”27 In reaching this conclusion, the court made clear that it
referred not only to the disputed content that was the subject of the
20. Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 3, Mahan v. Roc Nation, LLC, 720 F. App’x 55 (2d Cir.
2018) (No. 16-2791), 2017 WL 1328523.
21. Mahan, 720 F. App’x at 57.
22. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 503(b)).
23. Moreover, the case remains available on legal electronic databases and can be cited consistent
with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
24. Order Granting Motions to Dismiss, supra note 19, at *4–5.
25. Complaint, supra note 19, at 13.
26. Order Granting Motions to Dismiss, supra note 19, at *2, *4.
27. Id. at *3.
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copyright infringement action—i.e., the music files—but also to the media
equipment. Tellingly, the court noted that “the Ninth Circuit has
interpreted [the relevant provision of the Copyright Act] to permit
confiscation of ‘the whole of the paraphernalia’ even if the items ‘may be
used for other purposes.’”28
By allowing the deprivation of dual-use property under these
circumstances, the Second and Ninth Circuits—and the lower courts
governed by their authority—are forging a dangerous path for
constitutionally defective deprivations in future copyright cases. Both the
Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit have established themselves as highly
influential authorities in the copyright sphere in ways that cannot be
overstated. In the words of two commentators, the two circuits “are
undeniably the most important jurisdictions in terms of sheer number of
cases heard and the influence of their precedent.”29 Their outsized
prominence means that other courts, too, often look to Second Circuit and
Ninth Circuit law as persuasive authority on issues of copyright law.30
This Article therefore investigates whether this outcome is justified by
the purposes or history of our copyright regime. It establishes at the outset
that for more than a century, Congress has resisted entreaties to address
these thorny issues through statutory changes. Congress has instead
demonstrated its firm resolve to leave these issues to the courts.31 Part I
shows how this outcome developed against the historical backdrop.
Federal copyright law evolved from initially providing for destruction
only of infringing copies to an expansive rule that provides for destruction
of non-copyrighted equipment and apparatus that was used—or could be
28. Id. at *3 n.4 (quoting Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1972)). For
additional discussion of the Ninth Circuit ruling in Duchess Music, see infra text accompanying notes
75–77.
29. Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of Intellectual Property and Free
Speech, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 51 n.352 (2013) (citation omitted).
30. See, e.g., Markham Concepts, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 1 F.4th 74, 83 (1st Cir. 2021) (deciding
copyright issue with direct reference to Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit case law); TD Bank N.A. v.
Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 2019) (same); Brammer v. Violent Hues Prods., LLC, 922 F.3d 255,
263–64 (4th Cir. 2019) (same); Digit. Drilling Data Sys., L.L.C. v. Petrolink Servs., Inc., 965 F.3d
365, 380 (5th Cir. 2020) (same); Everly v. Everly, 958 F.3d 442, 452 (6th Cir. 2020) (same); Design
Basics, LLC v. Signature Constr., Inc., 994 F.3d 879, 887 (7th Cir. 2021) (same); Warner Bros. Ent.
v. X One X Prods., 644 F.3d 584, 593 (8th Cir. 2011) (same); Stan Lee Media, Inc. v. Walt Disney
Co., 774 F.3d 1292, 1300 & n.4 (10th Cir. 2014) (same); MidlevelU, Inc. v. ACI Info. Grp., 989 F.3d
1205, 1219 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 2863 (2021) (same); IMAPizza, LLC v.
At Pizza Ltd., 965 F.3d 871, 878–79 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (same); see also Mary LaFrance, Authorship,
Dominance, and the Captive Collaborator: Preserving the Rights of Joint Authors, 50 EMORY L.J.
193, 194 (2001) (noting that because the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits “hear the majority of
copyright appeals, and thus are particularly influential in copyright law,” their articulation of a
standard “makes it highly likely that other circuits will follow suit”).
31. See infra sections I.B–I.C.
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used—to infringe.
Given congressional resistance to crafting a legislative fix, Part II
exposes the grave risk that a deprivation order will violate the Due Process
Clause or the Takings Clause. The analysis plots the application of the
Fifth Amendment to permanent deprivations ordered in copyright actions.
When courts order the deprivation remedy on top of the already extensive
remedies in copyright actions, the risk grows that such deprivations are
excessive and unreasonable and therefore violate the Due Process Clause,
as measured by the standards set out in BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore32 and its progeny. Moreover, the uncompensated deprivations can
run afoul of the Takings Clause when they do not comport with
appropriate safeguards.
Part III sets out a doctrinal framework to avoid Fifth Amendment
violations by limiting deprivations to property (1) with a nexus (2) to a
willful infringement. In addition, permanent deprivations of dual-use
property should not occur except (3) where the subject property was used
substantially or predominantly to commit the litigated infringement.
The analysis undergirding the first part of this framework rests on a
comparison to the Copyright Act’s civil forfeiture provisions, which were
added in 2008.33 Civil forfeiture provisions generally allow for forfeiture
of property under conditions specified by statute, and in the copyright
context, the provisions allow for forfeiture to the federal government of
“[a]ny property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part to
commit or facilitate” criminal copyright infringement.34 The expansive
breadth of property forfeitable pursuant to civil forfeiture regimes—
viewed through the prism of the legal constraints and public outrage that
these regimes prompt—strongly suggests that it represents the outer
bounds of property deprivations that can be ordered without violating the
Fifth Amendment.35 Resort to the Copyright Act’s civil forfeiture
provisions thus strongly indicates that actual nexus to infringement should
be the sine qua non for permanent deprivations of dual-use property as a

32. 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
33. Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256, 4262–63 (2008).
34. 18 U.S.C.§ 2323(a)(1)(B); see infra text accompanying notes 161–222.
35. For discussion of the broad reach of civil forfeiture in copyright cases, see, for example,
Annemarie Bridy, Carpe Omnia: Civil Forfeiture in the War on Drugs and the War on Piracy, 46
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 683, 686 (2014) [hereinafter Bridy, Carpe Omnia] (“Civil forfeiture differs in important
ways from impoundment and destruction, which are copyright remedies that go back to the 1909
Act. . . . Unlike orders of impoundment and destruction, civil forfeiture of allegedly tainted property
can occur even if a claim of infringement against the owner of the property is never brought.”
(citations omitted)). As civil forfeiture regimes have exploded in recent decades, see infra
section III.A, the Supreme Court has incrementally curtailed the practice, most recently in Timbs v.
Indiana, 586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).
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remedy in civil copyright actions. Moreover, the Copyright Act’s civil
forfeiture can only apply in cases of willful infringement, consistent with
the general protection afforded to “innocent owners” in the civil forfeiture
regime.36 Evidence that the infringer reproduced or distributed a
copyrighted work, by itself, is insufficient to establish willfulness.37
Civil forfeiture provisions prove less helpful in resolving residual
concerns over proportionality, partly due to the anomalous way by which
they entered our jurisprudence via admiralty law.38 Most investigations
into the excessive character of civil forfeitures also get shoehorned into
the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause given their reliance on
underlying criminal offenses.39
Instead, a determination as to whether the deprivation remedy proves
grossly disproportional in a given case, and therefore excessive, flows
from the spout of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Where the
scrutinized sanction or remedy is not remedial but instead veers toward
punishment or deterrence, a Due Process proportionality determination
focuses on reprehensibility, the harm-penalty correlation, and the
sanctions imposed for comparable misconduct in other cases.40 Even after
affording the necessary deference to Congress, the need for a
proportionality showing stands clear. In addition to requiring showings of
nexus and willfulness, a court cannot constitutionally order the permanent
deprivation of property absent a showing that the subject property was
significantly or predominantly used to commit the litigated infringement
rather than for legitimate, lawful uses.
In addition, appellate courts should take special care to apply the
correct de novo standard of review to deprivation orders.41 An abuse of
discretion is inappropriate because it allows too much deference to the
court ordering the deprivation, given the grave constitutional risks posed
by this particular remedy. The de novo standard thus remains a critical
safeguard in the proper application of the deprivation order.

36. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1). For discussion of the “innocent owner” defense applicable to civil
forfeiture, see, for example, Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 451–53 (1996), and Austin v. United
States, 509 U.S. 602, 619 (1993).
37. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2).
38. For a brief discussion of this history, see infra note 227 and accompanying text.
39. Timbs, 586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 682; United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998);
Austin, 509 U.S. 602; see also Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 264 (1989).
40. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 435 (2001).
41. See id.; infra text accompanying notes 127–130.

Carstens (Do Not Delete)

2021]
I.

11/21/21 4:07 PM

COPYRIGHT’S DEPRIVATIONS

1285

SEIZURE AND DESTRUCTION OF DUAL-USE ITEMS:
FROM MAPS, CHARTS, AND BOOKS TO PIANO ROLLS TO
NONCHALANCE

Section 503 of the current Copyright Act provides for impoundment
during a pending copyright action, and separately provides for destruction
or other disposition following a determination of infringement:
As part of a final judgment or decree, the court may order the
destruction or other reasonable disposition of all copies or
phonorecords found to have been made or used in violation of the
copyright owner’s exclusive rights, and of all plates, molds,
matrices, masters, tapes, film negatives, or other articles by means
of which such copies or phonorecords may be reproduced.42
As with destruction, “other reasonable disposition” requires the
defendant to “deliver up” or otherwise relinquish title and possession.43
Such disposition thus is encompassed by the deprivation remedy, as used
in this analysis, because it has the same practical effect of permanently
depriving one of personal property. The Copyright Act also provides for
an extensive variety of other remedies to redress violations of copyright
and neighboring rights. Other available remedies under the Act include
actual damages, statutory damages, disgorgement of profits, attorney’s
fees, costs, and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief.44 The Act
also provides for criminal liability for certain willful infringements.45
As set out above, the deprivation remedy allows courts to order the
ultimate “destruction or other reasonable disposition” of two categories of
property: (1) the infringing copies themselves or copyrighted works used
in committing copyright infringement (such as a lawfully acquired DVD
that was unlawfully projected on a large screen),46 and (2) non42. 17 U.S.C. § 503(b). The impoundment provision applies to the same two categories of property,
prior to a determination of infringement, and the items are taken into the custody of the court. Id.
§ 503(a). Seizure and impoundment are now governed by the procedural safeguards set out in Rule
65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(f); see also infra note 77.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 60–62.
44. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–505.
45. Id. § 506.
46. The 1976 Copyright Act added the language “or used” to the provision in the early copyright
revision bills introduced in 1964, “thereby sweeping in copies lawfully made but unlawfully used.”
PATRY, supra note 7, § 22:84. The purpose was to prevent “bicycling” by movie houses, which
lawfully acquired a copy but then sometimes circulated and forwarded them to other establishments
for unauthorized exhibition, which constituted infringement. The term “bicycling” comes originally
from “the idea of a messenger speeding on a bicycle from one to the other houses of the same
exhibitor.” Brief for the Appellant at 27, Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S.
30 (1930) (No. 83), 1930 WL 30225. The practice was estimated to cost film distributors as much as
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copyrighted items that an infringer can use to produce infringing copies
or otherwise to commit infringement. The destruction or other disposition
of property in the first category does not result in a Takings Clause
violation, for the reasons already briefly noted.47
This discussion instead focuses on the development of our federal
copyright laws to apply to dual-use items that fall into the second
category. The historical analysis establishes that the deprivation remedy
retains roots in early copyright law that already existed at the adoption of
the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. It also suggests, however, that the
current iteration of the remedy evolved through an opaque process in
which concerns of overbreadth were voiced, acknowledged, and
ultimately left unresolved.
A.

The 1790 Copyright Act and 1870 Revisions: Limiting Destruction
to Infringing Copies and Expanding to Equipment

Congress enacted our nation’s first copyright legislation in 1790,48 a
year before it adopted the Constitutional Bill of Rights that contains the
Fifth Amendment’s settled-on language prohibiting uncompensated
takings.49 The 1790 Copyright Act50 protected a much less extensive body
of material compared to contemporary copyright law because its reach
was limited to maps, charts, and books.51 A party committed infringement
if it printed, reprinted, published, imported, sold, exposed to sale, or
otherwise facilitated the previous actions, without written consent.52 The
first copyright law enumerated a mandatory penalty for infringement that
called for the forfeiture and destruction of infringing articles by requiring
an offender to “forfeit all and every copy and copies of such map, chart,
book or books, and all and every sheet and sheets, being part of the same,
or either of them, to the author or proprietor of such map, chart, book or
$10,000,000 a year by the unauthorized exhibition of their pictures, id. at 28, an equivalent to almost
$150,000,000 today.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 9–13.
48. Copyright Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-15, 1 Stat. 124. The Act established the law pursuant to
its authority under Article 1 of the Constitution, which granted Congress the power “[t]o promote the
[p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes to [a]uthors and [i]nventors
the exclusive [r]ight to their respective [w]ritings and [d]iscoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
50. Pub. L. No. 1-15, 1 Stat. 124.
51. Lexicographer Noah Webster had produced an early draft, printed in 1789, that would have
limited copyright protection to books, but would have extended the protections to booksellers and
printers, not just authors. His original bill “was apparently destroyed when the British burned the
Capitol building” during the War of 1812, though copies survive. 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT
LAW AND PRACTICE 28 n.81 (1994).
52. Copyright Act of 1790 § 2.
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books, who shall forthwith destroy the same.”53
From an originalist perspective, the 1790 Act therefore does not
foreclose Fifth Amendment scrutiny of the contemporary deprivation
remedy as applied to a vastly wider body of material and as sometimes
carried out today by government officials. Still, the statute authorized a
deprivation of direct copies from an infringing party in a copyright
infringement suit, apparently without controversy.
Less than a century later, though, this early precedent for destruction
had started to develop in directions that signaled a possible tension with
the Takings Clause. Part of the impetus for the current deprivation
provisions developed from perceived shortcomings in the pre-1909
copyright regime, which strictly limited destruction and monetary
penalties, for example, to infringing copies in the infringer’s possession.54
Another difficulty was that the regime called for the infringer to turn over
goods to the copyright holder, but to do so under the antiquated doctrine
of replevin, which is based on restoring to an owner that which is his.55
Doctrinal confusion therefore hampered forfeiture efforts because “an
action for replevin by the true owner of the copyright would allow [them]
to recover ink, paper, and labor that were not [theirs] originally.”56
The 1870 revision exacerbated this difficulty. For the first time, federal
copyright law provided for an infringer to forfeit—and thus to be deprived
of—items other than the infringing articles themselves. The revisions
provided that an infringer “shall forfeit to the proprietor all the plates on
53. Id.
54. Backus v. Gould, 48 U.S. 798, 811–12 (1849) (finding error in award below that was based on
infringing articles that defendant “had published or procured to be published,” rather than the number
in his possession, as provided in revised statutes); see also Alexander, supra note 16, at 482–83.
Limiting monetary relief to copies in the infringer’s possession had the paradoxical result of
rewarding the infringer: the more infringing copies he successfully sold out of his possession, the
fewer he retained on hand from which damages could be calculated in favor of the copyright holder.
RICHARD ROGERS BOWKER, COPYRIGHT: ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW 265 (1912).
55. See Falk v. Curtis Pub. Co., 102 F. 967, 970 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1900), aff’d, 107 F. 126 (3d Cir.
1901) (stating that it seemed clear “that the action of replevin, as it is now known to the profession,
cannot be used for either purpose or for both [contemplated by copyright laws] without laying violent
hands upon it”); Rinehart v. Smith, 121 F. 148, 148 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1903) (stating that the court did not
think “that the common-law action of replevin” was an appropriate remedy to enforce forfeiture under
copyright laws, and that the subject “should be dealt with by Congress, so that an adequate and
uniform remedy might be provided”); Thornton v. Schreiber, 124 U.S. 612 (1888) (holding that where
infringing goods were found with a third party, the copyright holder could maintain an action for
replevin against the third party, but monetary recovery could not be based on those items because
they were not in infringer’s possession).
56. Alexander, supra note 16, at 483 & n.30 (quoting Colburn v. Simms, [1843] 2 Hare 543, 554
(UK), for the proposition that the doctrine thus distorted longstanding common law principles by
resorting to the legal fiction that “if [an individual] voluntarily mixes [their] property with that of
another, so that the two become inseparable, the entirety is held to belong to [the individual] whose
property has been invaded”).
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which the same shall be copied, and every sheet thereof, either copied or
printed.”57
The case law from this period supports the supposition that drafters
included the forfeiture of plates partly to cure the frustration that damages
and forfeiture of infringing articles were limited to those in the infringer’s
possession.58 The restriction to plates also proves instructive to the larger
analysis because the nature of printing plates at that time, with their
engraved facsimile or impression of the copyrighted work itself, rendered
them akin to infringing articles. The seized plates were directly implicated
in the making of the infringing products and were not capable of noninfringing uses.
B.

The 1909 Copyright Act: Expanding Destruction to Dual-Use
Property

The 1909 Copyright Act59 further resolved some of the doctrinal
difficulty by providing that an infringer shall “deliver up” to the
government, and the government—not the copyright holder—could
destroy the infringing works.60 This provision followed a corollary
provision that already called for the alleged infringer to “deliver up” “all
articles alleged to infringe a copyright” for impoundment while the action
was pending.61 This change obviated some of the messy issues associated
with replevin, but it also put the seizure and destruction more firmly in the
government’s hands.62
The 1909 Act also introduced the concept of destroying not just plates,
but dual-use items capable of infringing and non-infringing uses.63 It
57. 2 THE FEDERAL STATUTES ANNOTATED 268 (William M. McKinney & Charles C. Moore eds.,
1903) (emphasis added) (reproducing, in a footnote, the relevant provision from the Act of July 8,
1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 214); see also Werckmeister v. Am. Tobacco Co., 207 U.S. 375, 379–80 (1907)
(considering the same language in the 1895 revisions from the Act of Mar. 2, 1895, ch. 194, 28 Stat.
965). By the 1895 revision, copyright protection also had been extended to any “map, chart, dramatic,
or musical composition, print, cut, engraving, or photograph, or chromo, or of the description of any
painting, drawing, statue, statuary, or model or design intended to be perfected and executed as a work
of the fine arts.” Id.
58. See, e.g., Werckmeister, 207 U.S. at 381 (1907) (noting that pre-1909 copyright law did not
allow for monetary recovery for infringing articles except for those found in defendant’s possession);
Bolles v. Outing, 175 U.S. 262, 268 (1899) (same); Backus, 48 U.S. 798, 804 (1849) (same); see also
Thornton, 124 U.S. 612, 617–21 (1888) (holding that per-copy penalty should not be imposed against
defendant for infringing copies held in his possession, where he held them on behalf of another).
59. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075.
60. Id. § 25(d), 35 Stat. at 1081.
61. Id. § 25(c), 35 Stat. at 1081.
62. See 29 S. Ct. xlviii (1909) (calling for a federal marshal to “forthwith seize” the relevant articles,
“using such force as may be reasonably necessary in the premises”).
63. Copyright Act of 1909 § 25(d), 35 Stat. at 1081.
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specifically provided for destroying the equipment and apparatus—
which, if not concerning to the drafters of the later 1976 Copyright Act,
certainly occasioned debate during the drafting of the 1909 Copyright Act
thanks to a then-raging dispute over player piano rolls, the perforated rolls
of paper punctuated with holes that could produce the melodies of musical
compositions when played on player pianos.64 By then, copyright had
evolved to extend protection to an “author, inventor, designer, or
proprietor of any book, map, chart, dramatic or musical composition.”65
The 1909 Act was responding, in part, to the Supreme Court’s decision
one year earlier on the urgent question of whether player piano rolls
constituted unauthorized copies (infringing) or mere mechanical devices
(not infringing).66 In White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,67
the Court commented that the issue was “one of very considerable
importance” and “argued with force and ability,” then relied on, among
other things, an eye-ear distinction to rule that piano rolls did not infringe
on the copyrights in musical compositions.68 The eye could read the sheet
music of compositions; piano rolls instead relied on a “mechanical
device[]” to produce a product recognizable to the ear, and their
punctuated perforations meant nothing to the eye.69 The Court held that
responsibility for fixing this understandably unsatisfactory result resided
with the legislature, not the judiciary (partly because the drafters of recent
copyright laws appeared unconcerned about mechanical music boxes that
preexisted the piano rolls).70 Justice Holmes wrote separately to concur on
this point, stating, “[o]n principle anything that mechanically reproduces
that collocation of sounds ought to be held a copy, or, if the statute is too
narrow, ought to be made so by a further act, except so far as some
extraneous consideration of policy may oppose.”71
64. Alexander, supra note 16, at 486–87.
65. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, construed in White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v.
Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 9 (1908).
66. The British Parliament had already passed its own law, in 1906, putting itself in the latter camp
by including statutory language that “the expressions ‘pirated copies’ and ‘plates’ shall not, for the
purposes of this Act, be deemed to include perforated music rolls used for playing mechanical
instruments.” Musical Copyright Act 1906, 6 Edw. 7 c. 36 (UK).
67. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
68. Id. at 12–14.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 14–15. The Court noted that although the United States was not a party at the time to the
Berne Convention, the drafters of the existing copyright statutes would have been aware that the Berne
Convention of 1886 expressly provided that the “manufacture and sale of instruments serving to
reproduce mechanically the airs of music borrowed from the private domain” did not constitute
infringement. Id.
71. Id. at 20; see also Daniel Fisher, SOPA, Meet the Player Piano Copyright Threat, FORBES (Jan.
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The 1909 Act therefore reflected Congress’s quick response to the
Court’s suggestion for legislation. The 1909 Act’s “seemingly broad
language” that provided for destruction of infringing devices, and not just
infringing articles, “was aimed directly at piano roll producers.”72 It
required an infringer “[t]o deliver up on oath for destruction all the
infringing copies or devices, as well as all plates, molds, matrices, or other
means for making such infringing copies as the court may order.”73
Based on the legislative history and the timing following the Supreme
Court’s pronouncement, legislators certainly were aware of the argument
that the new language could cover dual-use items, such as reusable tools
or a printing press. What Congress actually intended as to the scope of the
destruction clause, however, remains unclear. According to one
commentator, the public statements and statutory text “evince an
understanding that courts had limited power to destroy items capable of
non-infringing uses” and, moreover, that “[a]lthough the drafters failed to
articulate a First Amendment limitation or a principle of proportionality,
it seems clear that they did not intend to give the courts carte blanche.”74
Yet the Ninth Circuit has declared quite the opposite, opining that
“[w]hile the Joint Committee reporting the proposed Act did not
elaborate” on the remedies of seizure and destruction, the outcome was
clear because the issue was often discussed in legislative hearings:
Congressmen, supporters, and opponents of the copyright bill
agreed that the impoundment and destruction provisions were
sweeping in their scope, and encompassed machines and items
which could be used for other, allegedly innocent purposes.
During the June, 1906 hearings, opponents of the bill foresaw the
spectre of the destruction of equipment, machines, and entire
plants. Proponents of the bill envisioned the same.75
In the end, Congress seemed content to leave it to courts to exercise
reasonable discretion to “decide and order just what should be destroyed
and what not.”76 This interpretation is perhaps best evidenced by the
18, 2012, 9:06 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2012/01/18/sopa-meet-the-playerpiano-copyright-threat/?sh= 6f35330114d8 [https://perma.cc/XY5V-56YS] (discussing the player
piano copyright dispute and noting that in the wake of White-Smith Publishing, the 1909 Copyright
Act included a two-cent per roll tax, which had risen to 6.95 cents by 1996).
72. Alexander, supra note 16, at 487.
73. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 25(d), 35 Stat. 1075, 1081.
74. Alexander, supra note 16, at 488.
75. Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458 F.2d 1305, 1308–09 (9th Cir. 1972) (citing Hearings on S.
6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the S. and H. Comms. on Pats., 59th Cong., 124, 146, 177–78, 200
(1906) (citation omitted)).
76. Alexander, supra note 16, at 487 (citing 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT
J180 (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976)).
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concluding phrase, “as the court may order,” because the phrase softens
and blunts what would otherwise be a mandatory obligation to “deliver
up” the infringing articles, devices, and other enumerated items.77
C.

The 1976 Copyright Act: Adding “Other Disposition” to the
Deprivation Remedy and Expanding Again to Dual-Use Property
that “May Be” Used to Infringe

This deference to the discretion of judges prevailed in the negotiations
leading to the 1976 Copyright Act, in which the deprivation remedy was
expanded but also elicited a sort of shrugging nonchalance. Under the
heading of “Impounding and Disposition of Infringing Articles,” the 1976
Copyright Act expanded the prior deprivation remedy beyond “infringing
articles” and the equipment or other means by which the infringing party
carried out infringement, by adding “other articles by means of which
such copies or phonorecords may be reproduced.”78 It also made the
destruction provision more flexible by allowing the court to order
“destruction or other reasonable disposition.”79 Thus a court could order
the infringing articles “sold, delivered to the plaintiff, or disposed of in
some other way that would avoid needless waste and best serve the ends

77. From the 1909 Copyright Act until the 1976 Copyright Act, courts exhibited confusion as to
whether destruction was discretionary or mandatory. The difficulty resided in an inconsistency
between the statutory language in the 1909 Act and the language in the Supreme Court’s rules and
recommendations for the implementation of the act. While the 1909 Act provided for destruction “as
the court may order,” the Supreme Court Rules stated that destruction was mandatory once
infringement was found. 29 S. Ct. xlviii (1909).
The statutory text might have prevailed except that a leading case, Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern,
declared that both texts made seizure mandatory in an impending case and made destruction
mandatory upon a finding of infringement. 458 F.2d at 1308. The appellate court therefore ordered
continued impoundment of seized material, which included:
25,000 complete tape recordings and master recordings, which serve to reproduce mechanically
appellants’ copyrighted musical compositions; blank tapes and cartridges designed for use in the
manufacture of tape recordings; printed labels; machinery used to transfer the sounds onto blank
tapes; packaging and promotional materials; and other equipment and machinery utilized in the
manufacturing process.
Id. at 1307. This incompatibility in the Supreme Court Rules remained a source of contention until
the rules were formally repealed in 2001. See PATRY, supra note 7, § 22:84 (stating that the status of
Supreme Court Rules remained unclear until their repeal in 2001, when Rule 65 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure was also amended to specifically apply to copyright impoundment proceedings);
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1261 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(case citing numerous authorities for the proposition that “[a]lthough neither the Supreme Court nor
the 1976 Act explicitly repealed the Copyright Rules, courts and commentators have questioned the
Rules’ continuing validity, both as a matter of statutory construction and constitutional law” (citation
omitted)).
78. 17 U.S.C. § 503(b) (emphasis added).
79. Id. (emphasis added).
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of justice.”80 This change was immaterial because destruction and
disposition both result in a permanent deprivation of personal property for
the affected party.
The boldest change to the deprivation remedy in the 1976 Copyright
Act, though, was the expansion to any item having the mere capacity to
reproduce an infringing copy, even if it never was used for such a
purpose.81 The 1909 Copyright Act had provided for the destruction of
dual-use items for “making such infringing copies,” and this language was
preserved in the 1963 bill proposed by the Copyright Office.82 Yet the new
language adding articles with the capacity to produce an infringing article
was introduced after that and survived into enacted law.
When concerns were raised about whether Congress “seriously
intended” to provide for destruction of “the pressing plant, or the
microfilm hardware equipment which produced or can produce the
infringing microfilm,” the Register of Copyrights responded that “you
could depend on the courts not to do something ridiculous if you give
them discretion.”83 Congress’s approach therefore reflects its refusal to
resolve this thorny issue and instead delegate it to the courts without
sufficient guidance to mitigate the risks of unconstitutional deprivations.
As discussed below, the courts have not adopted a consistent approach,
developed an appropriate test, or even always adopted the correct standard
for appellate review of decisions ordering the deprivation of dual-use
property.
II.

PERMANENT DEPRIVATIONS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
Government action that results in a permanent deprivation of tangible

80. Id.; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 160 (1976). According to Patry, the Copyright Office offered
another motivation for the change to include “or other disposition”:
In some cases where valuable copies are recovered (as in the case of motion picture prints), it
seems rather anomalous to require destruction of copies which were not infringing when made,
but which have infringed only through unauthorized performances. This would permit the court
in such instances to return to the copyright claimant the copies of the impounded films.
PATRY, supra note 7, § 22:84 (quoting STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG.,
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 4: FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON PRELIMINARY
DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 118 (Comm. Print 1964)).
81. 17 U.S.C. § 503(b).
82. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 25(d), 35 Stat. 1075, 1081; PATRY, supra note 7,
§ 22:84 (quoting STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION
PART 3: PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISCUSSIONS AND
COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT 29 (Comm. Print 1964)).
83. Alexander, supra note 16, at 491 (citing STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG.,
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 4: FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON PRELIMINARY
DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 132–33 (Comm. Print 1964)).
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personal property can trigger dual inquiries for purposes of determining a
violation of the Fifth Amendment. After all, the Fifth Amendment
contains a property-protecting two-step in its back-to-back Due Process
Clause and Takings Clause: “No person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law,” immediately followed
by “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”84
The Supreme Court’s cumulative interpretations of the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause show that while the deprivation
remedy sidesteps procedural due process concerns (thanks to bolstered
procedural protections implemented since passage of the 1976 Copyright
Act), due process concerns based on arbitrariness still abound. Moreover,
uncompensated deprivations of dual use property also can raise concerns
of unconstitutional takings.
A.

Due Process and Personal Property Deprivation

In establishing whether both procedural due process and substantive
due process are met for purposes of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause,85 the court process inherent in the copyright litigation itself
resolves procedural due process concerns. Nonetheless, the permanent
deprivation of dual-use property can prove “arbitrary or grossly
excessive” in some circumstances, violating substantive due process.86
Procedural due process, as established through numerous Court
decisions, refers to “the general rule that individuals must receive notice
and an opportunity to be heard before the Government deprives them of
property.”87 The Copyright Act’s provision for destruction makes no
direct reference to procedural safeguards, but an order for destruction or
other disposition requires a finding of infringement.88 As a practical

84. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The two doctrines that have developed from these clauses bear little
resemblance to one another. Early in its consideration of property deprivations, the Court rejected the
suggestion that “the deprivation of property without due process of law is the same thing as the taking
of private property for public use without just compensation, or that the former includes the latter.”
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. 273, 277 (1887).
85. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).
86. See infra text accompanying notes 96–101.
87. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 82 (1972); Sniadach v. Fam. Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
88. See Mahan v. Roc Nation, LLC, 720 F. App’x 55, 57 (2d Cir. 2018) (stating that district court
did not violate due process in ordering turn-over of infringing articles and dual-use items because the
party “received notice and had an opportunity to be heard prior to the issuance of the § 503(b) order”);
PATRY, supra note 7, § 22:84 (“Destruction of infringing goods or the devices used to commit
infringement is rarely controversial since destruction comes only after a trial on the merits.”).
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matter, the deprivation therefore occurs in the context of a determination
on remedies where the infringing party has an opportunity to be heard in
a judicial proceeding. It is probably no accident that some cases in which
orders calling for broad, non-specific destruction of an infringer’s
property involved defaulting defendants,89 though at least one court has
declined to impose such “extreme relief” against a defaulting defendant.90
Even the corollary provisions governing seizure and impoundment have
been shored up to withstand a procedural due process challenge.91
The substantive due process doctrine proves another matter. Generally
speaking, the Court has held that “[s]o-called ‘substantive due process’”
protects individuals against two types of government action: it “prevents
the government from engaging in conduct that ‘shocks the conscience,’ or
interferes with rights ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”92
Property deprivations generally have not fared well under this
formulation.93 Although extensive jurisprudence exists discussing
property deprivations in the context of the Takings Clause, one
commentator has observed that “plaintiffs who wish to assert that the
deprivation of a particular property interest violates substantive due
process have had difficulty getting the contemporary Supreme Court’s

89. See, e.g., Graduate Mgmt. Admission Council v. Raju, 267 F. Supp. 2d 505, 511–12 (E.D. Va.
2003) (ordering destruction of dual-use items against defaulting defendant in action alleging
infringement of higher education secured testing materials).
90. Evony, LLC v. Feng Inv., Ltd., No. CV 11-00141-SBA, 2014 WL 12658954, at *10 (N.D. Cal.
May 21, 2014).
91. The previous Supreme Court rules enacted for the 1909 Copyright Act were repealed in 2001,
and Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended at the same time to apply
specifically to copyright impoundment proceedings. The Committee Notes regarding the 2001
amendment state:
New subdivision (f) is added in conjunction with abrogation of the antiquated Copyright Rules
of Practice adopted for proceedings under the 1909 Copyright Act. Courts have naturally turned
to Rule 65 in response to the apparent inconsistency of the former Copyright Rules with the
discretionary impoundment procedure adopted in 1976, 17 U.S.C. §503(a). Rule 65 procedures
also have assuaged well-founded doubts whether the Copyright Rules satisfy more contemporary
requirements of due process.
FED. R. CIV. P. 65 advisory committee’s note to 2001 amendment.
92. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (internal citation omitted) (first quoting
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); then quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325–26 (1937)).
The substantive due process doctrine remains controversial. Justice Thomas recently complained
that “the oxymoronic ‘substantive’ ‘due process’ doctrine has no basis in the Constitution,” and thus
“it is unsurprising that the Court has been unable to adhere to any ‘guiding principle to distinguish
“fundamental” rights that warrant protection from nonfundamental rights that do not.’” Timbs v.
Indiana, 586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 682, 692 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting McDonald v.
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 811 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
93. See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555
(1997).
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attention.”94 Instead, the Court’s jurisprudence on substantive due process
“reflects an almost exclusive focus on fundamental liberty rights and has
largely ignored the existence of fundamental property interests.”95
Nonetheless, the Court has made clear that the Due Process Clause “of
its own force” prohibits arbitrary and “grossly excessive” punishments in
civil cases, including in cases involving deprivations of property.96 The
Court has admonished lower courts from entering such awards by setting
up “three guideposts” that an award should clear to avoid a constitutional
violation.97 In addition, it has recognized additional safeguards to protect
awards from the “zone of arbitrariness.”98
1.

The Three Guideposts that Rein in “Grossly Excessive” Awards

In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,99 the Court observed that
exemplary damages that are awarded beyond compensatory relief can
serve “legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence.”100 Damage
awards that are “grossly excessive” in relation to these interests, however,
“enter the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”101 The Court erected “three guideposts” to
94. Id. at 560.
95. Id. at 560–61. This dichotomy remains true because the substantive due process doctrine aims
pretty exhaustively at providing substantive protections for certain fundamental rights and liberties,
and a right to property is not recognized among them. See Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 93, at 560–
61 (“The Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence reflects an almost exclusive focus on
fundamental liberty rights and has largely ignored the existence of fundamental property interests.”);
see also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 141 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment “places property under the same protection as life and liberty”);
Rashmi Dyal-Chand, “A Poor Relation?” Reflections on a Panel Discussion Comparing Property
Rights to Other Rights Enumerated in the Bill of Rights, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 849, 861
(2008) (“[P]erhaps it is not at all wrong for property rights to serve as the ‘poor relation’ precisely so
that they may fulfill their role as the ‘guardian of every other right.’”).
96. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 434 (2001) (citing United
States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998)); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore (BMW v. Gore), 517
U.S. 559, 585–86 (1996); see also Sw. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 489, 491 (1915)
(stating that the question was “whether the application made of the statute in this instance [in
providing for penalty] was so arbitrary as to contravene the fundamental principles of justice which
the constitutional guaranty of due process of law is intended to preserve” and holding that the award
was “so plainly arbitrary and oppressive as to be nothing short of a taking of its property without due
process of law”).
97. See infra section II.A.1.
98. BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568; see infra section II.A.2.
99. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
100. Id. at 568.
101. Id. The majority in BMW v. Gore did not expressly state either way whether the prohibition
on grossly excessive awards stemmed from substantive or procedural due process. Justice Scalia in
his dissent, however, stated that the majority’s “identification of a ‘substantive due process’ right
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measure whether an award or penalty rises to a level of unconstitutional
arbitrariness: (1) the degree of reprehensibility; (2) the disparity between
the harm or potential harm suffered and the award or penalty; and (3) the
difference between “this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or
imposed in comparable cases.”102 This test supplants the rational basis and
strict scrutiny tests that ordinarily apply to substantive due process
inquiries.103
On the specific facts of BMW v. Gore, the Court ruled that a $2,000,000
punitive damage award against the American distributor of BMW
vehicles amounted to a “grossly excessive award” that “transcends the
constitutional limit” where the compensatory damages for the plaintiff’s
claim based on an undisclosed repainting of a new BMW vehicle, prior to
its sale to the plaintiff, totaled only $4,000.104 The Court emphasized that
the defendant’s conduct was not “sufficiently egregious to justify a
punitive sanction that is tantamount to a severe criminal penalty.”105
In his concurrence in BMW v. Gore, Justice Breyer (joined by Justices
O’Connor and Souter) made clear that compliance with procedural
safeguards did not always suffice to extinguish due process concerns.106
He wrote that despite a prevailing sentiment that if “fair procedures were
followed, a judgment that is a product of that process is entitled to a strong
presumption of validity,”107 the presumption would not hold where the
procedural safeguards offered “no significant constraints or protection

against a ‘grossly excessive’ award” was one of “[t]he most significant aspects of today’s decision.”
Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 574–75.
103. TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 456 (1993) (“The parties’ desire to
formulate a ‘test’ for determining whether a particular punitive award is ‘grossly excessive’ is
understandable. Nonetheless, we find neither formulation [of the rational basis or strict scrutiny tests]
satisfactory.”).
104. BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. at 559, 585–86.
105. Id. at 585. The Alabama Supreme Court had allowed a punitive damage of $2,000,000, which
it reduced from the original $4,000,000 punitive damage award provided by the jury and entered by
the trial court. Id. at 559. The punitive damage award was based on the car distributor’s policy of not
disclosing to consumers that a new vehicle was repainted prior to first sale, which it allowed to correct
paint damage during manufacture or transportation (here, the parties presumed the prior damage
occurred from acid rain during its overseas transportation). Id. at 563 n.1, 564. The award was based
on the calculated benefit to the distributor based on this undisclosed policy. Id. at 564.
In holding that the punitive damage award was “grossly excessive,” the Court noted that the
maximum civil penalty for violation of the state deceptive practices statute was $2,000 and that the
record disclosed “no deliberate false statements, acts of affirmative misconduct, or concealment of
evidence of improper motive,” unlike the deliberate misconduct in other cases where a large punitive
damage might be warranted. Id. at 579–85.
106. Id. at 586–88 (Breyer, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 586–87 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 457).
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against arbitrary results.”108 Justice Breyer emphasized that the
“constitutional concern, itself harkening back to the Magna Carta, arises
out of the basic unfairness of depriving citizens of life, liberty, or property,
through the application, not of law and legal processes, but of arbitrary
coercion.”109
The Court revisited the issue in State Farm Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Campbell,110 where it emphasized that an award that amounted to “grossly
excessive or arbitrary punishment” violated this standard.111 It provided
the following admonishment:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a
tortfeasor. The reason is that “[e]lementary notions of fairness
enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person
receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to
punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may
impose.” To the extent an award is grossly excessive, it furthers
no legitimate purpose and constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of
property.112
In BMW v. Gore and its progeny, including Campbell, the Court
examined punitive damages awards, which—like the deprivation remedy
available for civil copyright infringement—are awarded on top of
compensatory relief. Like the deprivations accomplished pursuant to the
deprivation remedy, punitive damages also are not per se
unconstitutional.113 As already noted, punitive damages are
constitutionally permissible, for example, “to further a State’s legitimate
interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.”114
The permanent deprivation of dual-use property thus can similarly violate
the “three guideposts” first set out in BMW v. Gore, as discussed in more
detail below.115
2.

Additional Safeguards Against Arbitrariness

In a series of cases, the Court has also made clear that additional
safeguards perform as a check on excessive awards. None of these

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 588.
Id. at 587.
538 U.S. 408 (2003).
Id. at 416 (emphasis added).
Id. at 416–17 (internal citations omitted) (quoting BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574).
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1991).
BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568.
See infra section IV.A.
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additional safeguards exist in the context of the deprivation remedy in the
Copyright Act.
First, the Court considers whether prescribed processes or rules are in
place to operate as a “sufficiently definite and meaningful constraint” on
unreasonable awards, bringing the thrust of Justice Breyer’s concurrence
in BMW v. Gore to the fore.116 Such standards should apply not only to
constrain unlimited jury discretion, but also to constrain “unlimited
judicial discretion for that matter”—as in the case of the unfettered
discretion of judges to order deprivations pursuant to the deprivation
remedy—to avoid “extreme results that jar one’s constitutional
sensibilities.”117 In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,118 the
Court held that several standards operated as a check on a jury-determined
punitive damages award, including specific jury instructions that outlined
the permissible considerations.119 In other cases, statutory limits or
standards can operate as such a safeguard.120
Second, though, reviewing courts must scrutinize the awards for
reasonableness.121 The Court has admonished that the real concern for
punitive damages is not necessarily the median ratio—which, according
to the Court, remains less than 1:1—but the “stark unpredictability” and
the inherent unfairness of having a dramatic and inconsistent spread
between high and low awards.122 The Court further observed that while
the widest spread occurred in state civil trials, the distribution even of
judge-assessed awards was “still remarkable.”123
For this reason, the Court held in Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool
Group124 that reviewing courts must apply a de novo standard of review
to awards that raise a constitutional issue, especially a Due Process or
116. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 22; see also BMW v. Gore, 571 U.S. at 586–97 (Breyer, J., concurring).
117. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.
118. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
119. Id. at 19–21.
120. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 495–96 (2008) (providing several
examples of state statutory caps).
121. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20–21. In Haslip, for example, the Court found that Alabama’s Supreme
Court had established adequate post-trial procedures for reviewing and scrutinizing awards that
provided “an additional check on the jury’s or trial court’s discretion.” Id.
122. Baker, 554 U.S. at 498–99 (“The real problem, it seems, is the stark unpredictability of
punitive awards. Courts of law are concerned with fairness as consistency, and evidence that the
median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards falls within a reasonable zone, or that punitive
awards are infrequent, fails to tell us whether the spread between high and low individual awards is
acceptable.”).
123. Id. at 499–500. The Court cited a series of studies, including a study of representative samples
of state court awards in tort, contract, and property cases, gathered directly from state-court clerks’
offices. Id.
124. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).

Carstens (Do Not Delete)

2021]

11/21/21 4:07 PM

COPYRIGHT’S DEPRIVATIONS

1299

Excessive Fines concern.125 Specifically, the de novo standard must
replace the more forgiving abuse-of-discretion standard. The Court
stressed that the need for de novo review arose from the need for “an
independent examination of the relevant criteria,”126 that is, the BMW v.
Gore guideposts, as well as its tendency to “‘unify precedent’ and
‘stabilize the law.’”127
With respect to the deprivation remedy in the copyright context, the
Copyright Act itself provides no guidance or standards that govern when
a court can order the deprivation remedy, except that the remedy is
available on a finding of infringement. Copyright infringement is a strict
liability regime and can attach even to non-willful infringers or to
infringers with a good-faith belief that the fair use doctrine shielded their
conduct.128
Taken together, the application of this body of jurisprudence
establishes the capacity of deprivation orders to cross the line. The
application of the BMW v. Gore guideposts especially shows the potential
disconnect between the interests of deterrence and the deprivation. The
lack of statutory guidance and rigorous appellate review further
demonstrate a worrying absence of additional safeguards that can operate
to rein in excessive deprivations ordered by the district courts. And, as
with punitive damages, the fact that some courts scrupulously toe the line
does not absolve those that cross it in ordering the permanent deprivation
of dual-use property.
B.

The Takings Clause and Personal Property Deprivation

The Takings Clause is the more typical go-to provision for examining
the constitutionality of property deprivations. It has generated a body of
jurisprudence that ranges from considering concrete property
deprivations, such as eminent domain, to the more conceptual property
deprivations, including those reflected in the regulatory Takings doctrine.
These two activity centers lead one on a circuitous path. The classic
Takings cases that focus on the government’s eminent domain power to

125. Id. at 435–39. The Court has similarly demanded that reviewing courts apply the de novo
standard to proportionality determinations for property forfeitures that raise constitutional questions.
See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336 (1998).
126. Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 425.
127. Id. at 435–36 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore (BMW v. Gore), 517 U.S. 559, 697–98
(1996)).
128. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Disco Azteca Distribs., Inc., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1172 (E.D. Cal.
2006) (“A plaintiff need not demonstrate the defendant’s intent to infringe the copyright in order to
demonstrate copyright infringement.” (citing Educ. Testing Serv. v. Simon, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1081,
1087 (C.D. Cal. 1999))).
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build highways129 or that focus on whether a government regulation
unduly interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations,130 for
example, can be difficult to analogize to the situation under consideration.
Further complicating the analysis, the Takings doctrine has developed
largely in cases alleging takings of real property, which necessitated the
Horne v. Department of Agriculture131 admonition that the prohibition
applies equally to personal property, historically known as chattels.132
This analysis sets aside the initial inquiry into whether the permanent
deprivation of dual-use items would qualify as private property “taken for
public use,”133 under the broad interpretation articulated by the Court in
Kelo v. City of New London.134 Since the 2005 Kelo decision, courts have
quickly dispensed with meaningful investigation of the “public use”
requirement on the grounds that it sets a very low bar, at least as a matter
of federal law rather than under corollary provisions of state
constitutions.135
129. See, e.g., Rindge Co. v. L.A. Cnty., 262 U.S. 700, 702 (1923) (challenging taking of private
land for public highways).
130. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
131. 576 U.S. 351 (2015).
132. Id. at 358. State courts have held the same with respect to takings clauses contained in their
state constitutions. See, e.g., G.M. McCrossin, Inc. v. W. Va. Bd. of Regents, 355 S.E.2d 32, 37 (W.
Va. 1987) (“Long ago, this Court acknowledged that [the state’s] constitutional prohibition ‘protects
private property in personalty as fully as in real estate.’” (quoting Teter v. W. Va. Cent. & Pittsburgh
Ry. Co., 14 S.E. 146, 148 (W. Va. 1891))); AGCS Marine Ins. Co. v. Arlington Cnty., 800 S.E.2d
159, 170 (Va. 2017) (stating that as far back as the Magna Carta, takings by the state applied to both
real and personal property, and that the state constitution’s takings clause makes no categorical
distinction between personal and real property).
133. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
134. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
135. At the end of the Kelo majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, the Court took pains to
“emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its
exercise of the takings power.” Id. at 489. The Court further noted that, “[i]ndeed, many States already
impose ‘public use’ requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline” either “as a matter of state
constitutional law” or through “state eminent domain statutes that carefully limit the grounds upon
which takings may be exercised.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
Even so, the Kelo Court’s broad interpretation of “public use” aroused swift fury and state reform.
See, e.g., John G. Sprankling, Property and the Roberts Court, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (2016)
(observing that the Kelo decision “ignited a firestorm of protest across the nation”); Carol L. Zeiner,
Eminent Domain Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing: Private Benefit Masquerading as Classic Public Use,
28 VA. ENV’T L.J. 1, 3 (2010) (“The public reaction to Kelo was outrage.”). After Kelo, forty-four
states enacted more restrictive rules for takings under their state constitutions or state law to prevent
a recurrence of a Kelo scenario. See 50 State Report Card: Tracking Eminent Domain Reform
Legislation Since Kelo, CASTLE COAL., http://castlecoalition.org/50-state-report-card [https://perma.
cc/9HU2-2LYC]. Because the Takings Clause in the U.S. Constitution provides only the floor of
protection against uncompensated takings, individual states can establish higher thresholds for
establishing “public use,” for example, in their state constitutions.
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The analysis instead presumes satisfaction of the “public use”
requirement and focuses on how the deprivation remedy can result in
direct appropriation or a categorical taking that implicates the Takings
Clause. This Takings analysis separately considers (1) what conduct
qualifies as a Taking, and (2) whether a recognized exception in the
Takings doctrine nonetheless exempts that conduct from the reach of the
Takings Clause.
1.

The Taking

The Takings Clause bars the government from taking private property
for public use without compensation, though in some instances, a
deprivation by the government in favor of a third party or by a third party
still implicates the Takings Clause. When the government itself
permanently deprives a litigant of property pursuant to the Copyright
Act’s deprivation remedy, the Takings examination is more
straightforward compared to cases where the deprivation is carried out by
a third party. For example, when Congress passed a 1965 law that called
for the federal government to “acquire all right, title, and interest, in and
to, certain items of evidence” considered by the Warren Commission in
investigating President Kennedy’s assassination, the widow of Lee
Harvey Oswald was entitled to compensation for the taking of Oswald’s
personal effects.136

Some commentators maintain that Kelo merely represented the culmination of a longstanding
erosion, rather than a thunderclap. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Opinion, The Story Behind Kelo v. City of
New London—How an Obscure Takings Case Got to the Supreme Court and Shocked the Nation,
WASH. POST (May 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/
05/29/the-story-behind-the-kelo-case-how-an-obscure-takings-case-came-to-shock-the-conscienceof-the-nation/ [https://perma.cc/X38Y-BNB2] (“Property law experts were well aware that
longstanding Supreme Court precedent permitted the government to take property for almost any
reason. But very few members of the general public [before Kelo] knew that.”); David Schultz, What’s
Yours Can Be Mine: Are There Any Private Takings After Kelo v. City of New London?, 24 UCLA
J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 195, 196 (2006) (arguing that the Kelo decision “did not really represent any
major change in the law as it had evolved in the last 20, if not 100, or so years”); G. David Mathues,
Shadow of a Bulldozer?: RLUIPA and Eminent Domain After Kelo, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653,
1688 (2006).
Mathues notes that between the Court’s 1954 Berman decision and 2002, “not a single federal case
rejected an eminent domain proceeding as not being for a public use.” Mathues, supra, at 1688. But
Mathues claims that Kelo was nonetheless controversial given the climate in which it was decided:
the pendulum had started to swing away from a broad reading of “public use,” and a public backlash
to the broad reading was brewing—so that three federal courts in three years, decided just before
Kelo, had held that condemnations did not represent a constitutional “public use” for purposes of the
Takings Clause. Thus, commentators at the time suspected that the Court’s grant of certiorari in Kelo
signaled that it would follow this new trend, instead of putting the Court’s imprimatur on the old one.
Id.
136. Porter v. United States, 473 F.2d 1329, 1332–34 (5th Cir. 1973).

Carstens (Do Not Delete)

1302

11/21/21 4:07 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1275

Horne, too, was premised on a direct taking of personal property by the
government. In Horne, government trucks arrived to haul away a certain
volume of raisins from raisin growers, a remnant of a New Deal-era
regulatory program to regulate the supply and therefore stabilize the price
of U.S.-grown raisins.137 Once in hand, the government sold the raisins to
non-competitive markets or disposed of them “by ‘any other means’
consistent with the purposes of the raisin program.”138 Residual proceeds
from the program were to be funneled back to the growers, except that in
some recent years, no proceeds were left after subtracting the program’s
substantial administrative costs.139 The Court held that the action
amounted to “a clear physical taking”140 based on the “actual taking of
possession and control” and the passing of title.141
As with the taking of Oswald’s personal property and the taking in
Horne, the government likewise sometimes takes actual possession and
control of dual-use items when ordered pursuant to the deprivation
remedy. Obvious analogies between these two scenarios therefore suggest
that the deprivation remedy in federal copyright law can result in an
unconstitutional Taking, when left uncompensated.
When ordering destruction of dual-use items, courts today are more
inclined, however, to order the defendant to deliver the items to the
prevailing plaintiff for that purpose142 (sometimes referred to as a “turnover” order) or that the infringer itself even destroy the items.143 The
wisdom of removing the government from the actual seizure and
destruction is obvious as a practical matter, as it saves the government the
burdens and resources that it would have to commit to seizing and
destroying the items.
But even when the government does not seize the property directly in
this scenario, the authorization to seize and destroy personal property still
can violate the Takings Clause. The Takings jurisprudence makes clear

137. Horne, 576 U.S. at 355–56.
138. Id. at 355 (quoting 7 C.F.R. § 989.67(b)(5) (2015)).
139. Id. But see id. at 380 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“According to the Government, of the 49
crop years for which a reserve pool was operative, [raisin] producers received equitable distributions
of net proceeds from the disposition of reserve raisins in 42.”).
140. Id. at 361.
141. Id. at 362 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 431
(1982)).
142. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. T & F Enters., Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d 833, 841 (E.D.
Mich. 1999) (granting request “that the seized videocassettes be delivered to Plaintiffs for
destruction”).
143. See, e.g., Getty Images (U.S.), Inc. v. Virtual Clinics, No. C13-0626JLR, 2014 WL 1116775,
at *10 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 20, 2014) (ordering infringing party “to delete all copies of the copyrighted
works” owned by or licensed to the prevailing party).
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that government action that results in the deprivation of title to personal
property likewise can constitute an impermissible taking, even if the
government does not obtain possession or title itself. Horne was premised
on the government taking both possession and title, but the Court in Yee
v. City of Escondido144 made clear that either alternative basis implicated
the Takings Clause.145 The result to the property owner is the same:
complete deprivation. The permanent turn-over of dual-use items to an
opposing party pursuant to the Copyright Act can be further characterized
as a per se, or categorical taking on the grounds that it deprives the owner
of all economically beneficial use of the property, per Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council.146
The deprivation remedy therefore can violate the Takings Clause
regardless of whether an order calls for destruction by the government or
turn-over to the plaintiff. Keep in mind, though, that no unconstitutional
Taking occurs if a court subtracts the value of the transferred property
from a monetary award for copyright infringement, in the shape of either
monetary damages or statutory damages. In such cases, the deprivation
would no longer constitute an uncompensated taking and so would not
violate the Takings Clause.
The reason for ordering the set-off occurs where turn-over to the
opposing side accompanies other forms of relief, and especially where the
copyright holder has obtained both actual damages and disgorged profits
so as to be compensated beyond its harm. Simply put, the turn-over acts
as additional, duplicative award to the copyright holder beyond that
contemplated by the Copyright Act.147
Few courts have recognized that a turn-over of infringing articles or
dual-use items can be duplicative or redundant. One reason may be that
destruction is considered equitable relief, along the lines of injunctions
not to infringe.148 Still, at least one court has held that where the infringer
144. 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
145. Id. at 522–23 (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426); see also Norman v. United States, 429 F.3d
1081, 1088–89 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (regarding claim that government action required party to transfer
title to a third party, the court stated that it “is axiomatic that ‘[w]here the government authorizes a
physical occupation of property (or actually takes title) the Takings Clause generally requires
compensation’” (quoting Yee, 503 U.S. at 522)).
146. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
147. See, e.g., MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 9.09[D] (6th ed.
2014) (“In addition, a time-honored variant on the § 503(b) order requiring the destruction of
infringing materials is the ‘turnover’ order, under which the defendant must surrender the articles in
question to the plaintiff. Such orders may raise delicate questions of fairness.”).
148. See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 313 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that a forfeiture order
under section 503(b) is an equitable remedy “issued under the broad powers vested in a trial judge”);
LEAFFER, supra note 147, § 9.09[D] (stating that “[i]n addition to temporary and/or permanent
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was required to turn over dual-use items to the plaintiff, the value would
be subtracted from the plaintiff’s monetary award.149 There, the court
ordered the defendant to turn over to the plaintiff equipment that the court
found was used primarily for infringing purposes, and it further directed
the plaintiff “to sell any remaining machinery, which would presumably
be equipment for general photographic or sound duplication and can be
used for legitimate, non-infringing purposes.”150 The reasoning echoed
the reasons for the “other reasonable disposition” supplied in the
legislative history, while also preventing the plaintiff from obtaining a
double recovery.151 Specifically, the court held that the proceeds of
plaintiff’s sale of the property, less sale costs, “are to be applied pro rata
against the damages assessed against defendants” because “[s]uch a sale
is clearly contemplated by the ‘other reasonable disposition’ language of
Section 503(b) and is far preferable to the destruction of useful
duplicating equipment.”152
Most courts, however, do not provide for such a set-off where they
order the turn-over of dual-use items to the prevailing party. Absent this
scenario, a Taking therefore might occur unless an exemption based on
public nuisance, civil forfeiture, or other basis applies.
2.

Exceptions to Takings

As applied to dual-use property, most of the exceptions that would
permit the government to take property without running afoul of the
Takings Clause do not apply. First and foremost, the government can seize
contraband and other objects that are illegal in and of themselves.153 This
exception applies to infringing copies, as noted above, so that their
destruction does not amount to a Taking.154 Dual-use items are not
contraband, however, because the property is not banned but rather it is
“only the alleged use to which” the particular property is put that subjects

injunctive relief, equitable remedies available to the successful plaintiff under the Copyright Act
include impoundment and eventual disposition of the defendants infringing copies and the equipment
used to produce them, up to and including possible confiscation and destruction”). But see Feltner v.
Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 34 (1998) (holding that the Copyright Act of 1790 did
not provide for equitable remedies at all, but also stating that the other remedies provisions of the
Copyright Act use the term “court” in contexts generally thought to confer authority on a judge, rather
than a jury).
149. RSO Recs., Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849, 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
150. Id. at 864.
151. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 503(b)).
152. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 503(b)).
153. See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 458, 459 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 9–13.
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a party “to its possible loss.”155
Dual-use items also are not susceptible to seizure pursuant to the Public
Nuisance doctrine, which resides at the intersection of Torts and Property
law. A “public nuisance” is generally defined by state law as “an
unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.”156
Since the early development of the Mugler-Hadacheck doctrine, the
government does not violate the Takings Clause when it regulates
“harmful or noxious uses” of private property that are akin to a public
nuisance.157 Thus the government can exercise its police power to seize
items that either create a public nuisance or violate a law or ordinance
established to abate public nuisances, from wild animals or pit bulls,158 to
fireworks,159 to fishing nets or contaminated meats, all without paying
compensation.160 In doing so, the government restricts property that
endangers the health, morals, or safety of the community. Such nuisancebased exceptions to the Takings Clause are inapposite as applied to the
seizure of dual-use items, however, given the unlikelihood that a
hypothetical printing press, piano, or computer endangers public health,
morals, or safety.161
Civil forfeiture regimes, however, also result in a direct taking of
personal property that the Court has held do not violate the Takings
Clause.162 And they provide the strongest basis for examining whether
155. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965).
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (AM. L. INST. 1979).
157. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022 (1992) (“It is correct that many of our
prior opinions have suggested that ‘harmful or noxious uses’ of property may be proscribed by
government regulation without the requirement of compensation.”); see Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887) (no taking of brewery where law prohibited manufacture of alcoholic beverages);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (no taking of brickmaking plant where law barred
operation of brickyard or brickkiln in residential area). A ban or restriction on private property is
permitted pursuant to the doctrine even if the particular property did not cause the anticipated harm,
on the grounds that a ban was “expected to produce a widespread public benefit and applicable to all
similarly situated property.” Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133–34, 134
n.30 (1978).
158. Sallyanne K. Sullivan, Banning the Pit Bull: Why Breed-Specific Legislation Is Constitutional,
13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 279 (1988) (discussing how pit bull incidents and characteristics support
regulation pursuant to police power to protect public safety).
159. Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State or Local Laws
Regulating the Sale, Possession, Use, or Transport of Fireworks, 48 A.L.R.5th 659 (1997).
160. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 133–36 (1894).
161. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 145–46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the
“nuisance exception to the taking guarantee is not coterminous with the police power itself” but that
“[t]he question is whether the forbidden use is dangerous to the safety, health, or welfare of others”).
162. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 443, 452 (1996) (holding that no Takings Clause violation
occurred where forfeited automobile was used in sexual act between a convicted party and a prostitute,
though jointly owned by the convicted party’s innocent wife, because “the cases authorizing actions
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property seized under the Copyright Act’s deprivation remedy would
violate the Takings Clause. Not only does federal copyright law include
civil forfeiture provisions, but the breadth of property that can be seized
pursuant to civil forfeiture suggests that it represents the outer bounds of
property deprivations that are beyond the reach of the Takings Clause.
Civil forfeiture provisions were added to the Copyright Act in the
Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property
(PRO IP) Act of 2008163 to “enhance remedies for violations of
intellectual property laws, and for other purposes.”164 As the name
suggests, civil forfeiture actions are civil in nature, despite their reliance
on criminal activity, and civil forfeiture is only available if provided by
statute,165 as in the Copyright Act.166 Civil forfeiture is used “to guarantee
that wrongdoers do not reap the financial benefits of criminal activity or
continue to use the tools of their illegal trade.”167
Civil forfeiture actions are in rem proceedings against an article itself
as a participant in criminal activity and therefore do not require criminal
conviction of the wrongdoer in an in personam action. The Supreme Court
stated as early as 1827: “The thing is here primarily considered as the
offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing.”168
Civil forfeiture regimes are not commonly or historically associated
with or used in copyright law. Their prevailing use remains in seizing
property suspected of being used in, or bought with proceeds of, drug
trafficking.169 Having been introduced into the copyright regime,
of the kind at issue are ‘too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to
be now displaced’” (quoting Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921))).
163. Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256, 4256, 4262–63 (2008).
164. Id. The Copyright Act also contains criminal forfeiture provisions that directly parallel the
criminal forfeiture provisions more prevalent and more publicized in drug cases. 18 U.S.C. § 2323(b).
The criminal forfeiture provisions are beyond the scope of this article, though it bears keeping in mind
that criminal forfeiture actions, brought by federal prosecutors, do require a criminal conviction. In
the case of conviction, though, the Copyright Act provides that seizure and destruction or other
disposition are mandatory but limited to infringing articles. Id. The criminal forfeiture provisions do
not provide for the seizure and destruction of non-infringing dual-use property.
165. 18 U.S.C. § 983.
166. Id. § 2323(a).
167. Craig Gaumer, A Prosecutor’s Secret Weapon: Federal Civil Forfeiture Law, U.S. ATT’YS’
BULL. (U.S. Dep’t of Just., D.C.), Nov. 2007, 59, 59.
168. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1 (1827); see also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416
U.S. 663, 693 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“I realize that the ancient law is founded on the fiction
that the inanimate object itself is guilty of wrongdoing.”); Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254
U.S. 505, 510 (1921) (stating that Congress provides for civil forfeiture for breach of revenue
provisions “by ascribing to the property a certain personality, a power of complicity and guilt in the
wrong”).
169. Rebecca R. Ruiz, Justice Dept. Revives Criticized Policy Allowing Assets to Be Seized, N.Y.
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however, the civil forfeiture carve-out in the Takings doctrine provides
the principal rationale for investigating the civil forfeiture provisions now
contained in federal copyright law and assessing their impact.170
III. STARTING A CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: DUALUSE ITEMS AND THE CIVIL FORFEITURE TEST OF NEXUS
AND WILLFULNESS
The civil forfeiture doctrine offers a strong, starting basis for a doctrinal
framework that evaluates the deprivation remedy as applied to dual-use
items. The civil forfeiture provisions added to federal copyright law in the
PRO IP Act171 provide a direct corollary for analysis.
The cacophony of controversy that has erupted in our society
surrounding civil forfeitures proves instructive. Even though the Court has
made clear that property deprivations accomplished through application
of civil forfeiture regimes do not violate the Takings Clause,172 the
continuing controversy has already yielded several reform efforts,
including passage of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000.173
The Court has also worked to delineate proportionality restraints, most
recently in Timbs v. Indiana.174
The public outrage and invited scrutiny that attach to civil forfeiture
regimes heavily suggest that the property deprivations accomplished as
civil forfeitures test the outer limits of constitutionally sound property
deprivations. By superimposing the Copyright Act’s civil forfeiture
provisions over the deprivation remedy, one therefore can extract key
clues as to the outer contours of property deprivations exempted from the
reach of the Takings Clause, in particular.
The civil forfeiture provisions therefore provide a valuable tool for
evaluating permanent deprivations that occur where courts order the
TIMES (July 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/19/us/politics/justice-department-civilasset-forfeiture.html [https://perma.cc/Y5EN-4SR9] (quoting Deputy Attorney General Rod J.
Rosenstein as saying that civil forfeiture was “about taking assets that are the proceeds of, or the tools
of, criminal activity, and primarily drug dealing”); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Acting
Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Historic Jury Verdict Finding Forfeiture of Midtown Office
Building and Other Properties (June 29, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/actingmanhattan-us-attorney-announces-historic-jury-verdict-finding-forfeiture-midtown [https://perma.cc
/8ZEN-2HMD] (announcing jury-approved forfeiture of thirty-six-story Manhattan office tower,
valued at $500 million, as “largest terrorism-related civil forfeiture in United States history”).
170. See infra Part III.
171. Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256, 4262–63 (2008).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 162–169.
173. Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (2000).
174. Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (holding forfeiture “grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of [the] offense” and therefore violative of the Excessive Fines Clause).
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destruction or other disposition of dual-use items. This analysis
establishes the need for actual nexus between the conduct and the property
and a showing of willful infringement.
A.

Adding Civil Forfeiture to Federal Copyright Law, Against the
Broader Backdrop of Expanding Civil Forfeiture Regimes

The addition of civil forfeiture provisions in the Copyright Act175 was
just one part of a broader federal law enforcement initiative that saw the
rapid proliferation of civil forfeiture regimes. Rather than being directed
solely at curbing copyright infringement, they instead represented one
step in an incremental march toward expanding federal civil forfeiture by
successively implanting new civil forfeiture provisions in a wide variety
of statutory regimes.
Despite its long history, civil forfeiture was seldom used until the
1980s, save for flourishing briefly during Prohibition with the seizure of
bootleg liquor and the equipment and vehicles used to produce and
transport it.176 Civil forfeiture emerged full-throttle from its relative
dormancy during the war on drugs in the early 1980s.177 Since then, civil
175. In introducing the bipartisan bill in July 2008, Senator Leahy remarked that it “improves and
harmonizes the forfeiture provisions in copyright and counterfeiting cases” to help law enforcement
combat piracy and counterfeiting, partly because the internet had become “an unparalleled tool for
piracy.” 154 CONG. REC. S7280–81 (daily ed. Jul. 24, 2008) (statement of Sen. Leahy). Senator Leahy
also remarked that “[j]ust in the movie industry, piracy costs 140,000 U.S. jobs and $5.5 billion in
wages” and “an estimated $837 million in additional tax revenue” each year. Id.; see also Bridy,
Carpe Omnia, supra note 35, at 687 (analyzing “civil asset forfeiture, its use and abuse in the war on
drugs, and its problematic translation into the realm of online copyright crimes”). Since adopted, the
civil forfeiture provisions have been employed directly in several cases in which domain names have
been seized and forfeited. See, e.g., United States’ Response in Opposition to Claimant’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment at 2, United States v. PlayboyMonthly.com, No. 8:10-cv-1214-T-27TBM,
2010 WL 4619773 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (stating that the court had granted the governments’ “motions
for warrants of arrest in rem of Defendant Domains”); see also Bridy, Three Notice Failures, supra
note 7, at 795–816 (discussing application of civil forfeiture provisions to domain name seizures).
176. E.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155 (1925) (stating that National Prohibition Act
“was intended to reach and destroy the forbidden liquor in transportation and the provisions for
forfeiture of the vehicle and the arrest of the transporter were incidental”); accord Darpana Sheth,
Incentives Matter: The Not-So-Civil Side of Civil Forfeiture, FED. LAW., July 2016, at 46, 47 (stating
that “[a]s ‘drastic’ as forfeiture laws may have appeared during Prohibition, they were quite limited
in comparison to the forfeiture laws enforced today” because forfeiture was considered “incidental”
to purpose of destroying forbidden contraband); Stefan B. Herpel, Toward a Constitutional
Kleptocracy: Civil Forfeiture in America, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1910, 1923 (1998) (reviewing LEONARD
LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY (1996)) (“With the repeal of Prohibition
in 1932, the use of civil forfeiture in criminal law enforcement waned considerably, at least at the
federal level. But civil forfeiture gained new prominence in the 1980s, when the federal government
began using it aggressively in the enforcement of laws prohibiting or regulating the possession or sale
of controlled substances.”).
177. See, e.g., Bridy, Carpe Omnia, supra note 35, at 694–95 (stating that although civil forfeiture
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forfeiture provisions have been added in many additional contexts, so that
“[w]hat began as an effort to address a growing national and international
drug trafficking problem in the 1980s has become a powerful tool to
address white collar crime, international organized crime, drug
trafficking, cybercrime, terrorism, human trafficking, child exploitation,
and so much more.”178
Civil forfeiture regimes have provoked significant controversy, even in
the public forum, given their lower standard of proof, onerous procedures
for challenging forfeitures and reclaiming property, disproportionate
impact on lower-income individuals, failure to require prosecution of the
underlying illegal activity, and association with racial profiling.179
Moreover, the Court has upheld civil forfeiture of property or property
interests of third parties who did not participate in the underlying illegal
activity,180 though the subsequent Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of
2000181 provides that “[a]n innocent owner’s interest in property shall not
be forfeited under any civil forfeiture statute,” where the claimant proves
innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.182 Justice Thomas, for one,
has made his distaste for civil forfeiture regimes known, complaining that
they lead to “egregious and well-chronicled abuses” and “frequently

dates to colonial times, “it was seldom called upon until its meteoric rise in the enforcement of federal
drug laws beginning in the 1980s,” and observing that “the war on drugs led to an increase in federal
asset forfeitures of more than 1,500% between 1985 and 1990.” (citation omitted)).
178. Jaikumar Ramaswamy, Overview of Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Program, U.S.
ATT’YS’ BULL. (U.S. Dep’t of Just., D.C.), Sept. 2013, at 1, 1 (noting growth of civil forfeiture on
thirtieth anniversary of the Department of Justice’s Asset Forfeiture Program).
179. See Jacob Sullum, How Cops Got a License to Steal Your Money, FORBES (Sept. 11, 2014)
(on file with author); Michael Sallah, Robert O’Harrow Jr., Steven Rich & Gabe Silverman, Stop
and Seize, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/0
6/stop-and-seize [https://perma.cc/SX36-6UFW]; Chloe Cockburn, Easy Money: Civil Asset
Forfeiture Abuse by Police, ACLU (Feb. 3, 2010), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-lawreform/reforming-police/easy-money-civil-asset-forfeiture-abuse-police [https://perma.cc/D4MH5PGH]; LEONARD W. LEVY, LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY (1996). In Part III,
this Article suggests a test based on the civil forfeiture regime for judges to apply before ordering
destruction or other disposition of dual-use items in a copyright infringement case. This proffered test
implicates few of the noted concerns because the courts would apply the test in the course of judicial
proceedings. See Bridy, Carpe Omnia, supra note 35, at 799–800 (pointing out that civil forfeiture
“differs in important ways” from seizure and destruction under the Copyright Act because the
copyright impoundments meet strict standards for preliminary injunctions and orders of destruction
“can issue only upon final judgement,” while civil forfeiture does not require prosecution, and civil
forfeiture warrants can be issued “on a mere showing of probable cause”).
180. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 1001 (1996); see also CRIM. PRAC. MANUAL § 107:39
(2021) (stating that several statutes, including those for proceeds of drug transactions and for money
laundering, were amended after Bennis to preclude forfeiture of property where the owner was
unaware or did not consent to the underlying illegal activity).
181. Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202.
182. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1).
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target the poor and other groups least able to defend their interests in
[civil] forfeiture proceedings.”183
In the copyright context, dual-use items make easy targets for civil
forfeiture. Dual-use items capable of both infringing and non-infringing
uses have long been a thorn in the side of developing copyright law. These
items pose difficulties not only in fashioning remedies, as with the
deprivation remedy, but also in deciding where to draw the line as to what
conduct gives rise to copyright liability.184 These long-standing
difficulties are exacerbated in the digital environment, where dual-use
items can prove capable not only of non-infringing uses but also of
producing millions and even billions of infringing copies within a short
span of time.185
183. Leonard v. Texas, 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 847, 848 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial
of certiorari) (noting petitioner raised due process claim for the first time in their petition to the Court)
(citations omitted); see also Bennis, 516 U.S. at 454 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“One unaware of the
history of forfeiture laws and 200 years of this Court’s precedent regarding such laws might well
assume that such a scheme is lawless—a violation of due process.”). Criticisms of civil forfeiture
have grown in recent years alongside increased use of civil forfeiture regimes, from $27.2 million in
1985 to more than $5 billion in federal forfeitures in 2014. Christopher Ingraham, Law Enforcement
Took More Stuff from People than Burglars Did Last Year, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/11/23/cops-took-more-stuff-from-peoplethan-burglars-did-last-year [https://perma.cc/GJ7P-UP9C] (also reporting that fourteen states took in
a further combined $250 million through civil forfeitures in 2013); see also Dan Frosch, AssetForfeiture Laws Raise Concerns, WALL ST. J. (July 5, 2015, 5:20 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/asset-forfeiture-laws-raise-concerns-1435868428
[https://perma.cc/E59A-V7PE] (stating that according to the Institute for Justice, which culled federal
data reports, the Department of Justice collected an average of $1.5 billion per year between fiscal
years 2001 and 2014). A single U.S. Attorney’s Office in northern Illinois reported that its office
alone collected $75 million in criminal, civil and asset forfeiture actions in Fiscal Year 2017, with
civil forfeiture and asset forfeiture actions constituting more than half. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Just., U.S. Att’y’s Off. N.D. Ill., U.S. Attorney’s Office Collected Nearly $75 Million in Civil,
Criminal and Asset Forfeiture Actions in Fiscal Year 2017 (Feb. 7, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/pr/us-attorney-s-office-collected-nearly-75-million-civilcriminal-and-asset-forfeiture [https://perma.cc/3K8A-AEXV]. One of the most controversial
programs, an equitable sharing program in which state and local authorities have authority to seize
property through federal civil asset forfeiture laws and share in the forfeited assets, was discontinued
during the last years of the Obama administration but resurrected in the early months of the Trump
administration. Ruiz, supra note 169; Douglas A. Leff, Money Laundering and Asset Forfeiture:
Taking the Profit Out of Crime, U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL. (U.S. Dep’t of Just., D.C.), Sept. 2013, at 4, 7
(stating that federal law enforcement processes a seizure originally made by state or local law
enforcement officers relying on federal forfeiture law, and that under equitable sharing, the state or
local agencies “can receive up to 80 percent of the net forfeiture”).
184. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 417 (1984) (video
tape recorders); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 913 (2005)
(peer-to-peer files-sharing networks).
185. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., 545 U.S. at 923 (“[N]o one can say how often
the software is used to obtain copies of unprotected material. But MGM’s evidence gives reason to
think that the vast majority of users’ downloads are acts of infringement, and because well over 100
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In the modern era, it is precisely the capacity of modern equipment and
technology for infringing activities that illustrates the attraction in
removing dual-use items from an infringer’s possession, as a deterrent to
prevent future infringement. The same capacity of modern technology to
fuel and facilitate widespread copyright infringement also served as an
impetus for adding civil forfeiture provisions to federal copyright law in
the 2008 PRO IP Act.186
B.

Civil Forfeiture in Copyright: Requiring Actual Nexus to
Infringement and Willfulness

The Copyright Act’s civil forfeiture provisions specifically provide for
forfeiture of “[a]ny property used, or intended to be used, in any manner
or part to commit or facilitate” criminal copyright infringement.187 The
“used, or intended to be used” language indicates a direct, not merely
hypothetical, nexus requirement.188 The deprivation remedy should
similarly require direct nexus as a threshold showing. Civil forfeiture also
requires willfulness that should likewise be imported into the deprivationremedy analysis.
The Copyright Act’s civil forfeiture provisions provide for forfeiture
of two other categories of property that should be mentioned but
dismissed from this analysis. First, the same civil forfeiture provisions
also allow for forfeiture of “[a]ny article, the making or trafficking of
which is, prohibited” under the relevant criminal copyright infringement
provisions.189 This refers to the kinds of infringing articles, or direct
copies, that do not require a Takings analysis.190 Second, the Copyright
Act’s civil forfeiture provisions also provide for forfeiture of “[a]ny
million copies of the software in question are known to have been downloaded, and billions of files
are shared across the FastTrack and Gnutella networks each month, the probable scope of copyright
infringement is staggering.”).
186. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-617, at 21–22 (2008).
187. 18 U.S.C. § 2323(a)(1)(B). These same civil forfeiture provisions apply to copyright-related
actions, including when a party affixes counterfeit or illicit labels to infringing copies, so as to deceive
consumers as to the authenticity of the work, as well as bootleg copies of sound recordings and music
videos of live musical performances. See id. § 2319A.
188. Id. § 2323(a)(1)(B).
189. Id. § 2323(a)(1)(A).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 9–11. To the extent that such infringing articles could
include unauthorized derivative works, their seizure and destruction as a possible Takings violation
is discussed supra Part II. In the civil forfeiture context, such infringing articles are akin to
contraband, whose seizure in civil forfeiture proceedings does not even offend the liberal wing of the
Court. In Justice Stevens’s dissent in the civil forfeiture case Bennis v. Michigan, for example, Justice
Stevens found no problem with the government seizure of “‘objects the possession of which, without
more, constitutes a crime’ [because] the government has an obvious remedial interest in removing the
items from private circulation . . . .” 516 U.S. 442, 459 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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property constituting or derived from any proceeds obtained directly or
indirectly as a result of the commission” of a relevant offense.191 This
category consists of property simply not subject to the deprivation
remedy. Other remedies exist in copyright law for awarding a prevailing
copyright holder “any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the
infringement,” which can be awarded in addition to actual damages.192
The real crux of determining a Takings violation rests on whether or
not the dual-use item was used or intended to be used in committing
copyright infringement. In this context, forfeiture of property on grounds
that it merely may be used to commit an offence would constitute an
uncompensated Taking. Depriving one of property based on its mere
capacity for unlawful use would turn the entire premise of the alreadytenuous civil forfeiture doctrine on its head because the underlying
premise of the in rem proceeding is that the forfeited article itself
committed the crime.193 The analogy from the civil forfeiture drug cases
would be the forfeiture of an automobile that might be used in drug
trafficking, which does not pass constitutional muster.
Actual nexus likewise should be the sine qua non to seizing and
destroying, or otherwise disposing of, dual-use property in a civil
copyright infringement action. The different procedural posture of civil
forfeiture actions and civil copyright infringement actions (in rem actions
as opposed to in personam actions) provide no basis for treating the nexus
requirement differently. If actual nexus is required where a higher
threshold showing of criminal copyright infringement is shown—which
requires findings of both willfulness on the part of the infringer and
seriousness of the offense194—all the more reason that actual nexus should
191. 18 U.S.C. § 2323(a)(1)(A), (C).
192. 17 U.S.C. §§ 504(a)(1), 504(b). The copyright holder must elect between either statutory
damages or actual damages in combination with profits of the infringer. Id. § 504(a).
193. In that context, authorities might still seek forfeiture of the automobile on grounds that it was
purchased with the proceeds of a crime. As noted above, that basis is inapplicable to this analysis
because other civil remedies are directed toward disgorging or recouping an infringer’s profits in civil
copyright infringement actions. See id. § 504(b).
194. Id. § 506(a)(1). Serious infringement to establish criminal liability exists where the infringer
willfully committed infringement either: (a) for private financial gain or commercial advantage;
(b) by electronically reproducing or distributing one or more copyrighted works with a retail value
above a threshold amount (currently $1,000) within a 180-day period; or (c) by distributing, via
computer network available to members of the public, a work that the infringer knew or should have
known was intended for commercial distribution. Id. Criminal copyright infringement under (c) is a
felony, as is criminal copyright infringement under (b) if the infringer reproduced or distributed at
least ten copies with a retail value greater than $2,500. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PROSECUTING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES 16–17 (4th ed. 2013). In cases of willful infringement, proving
infringement for financial gain or commercial advantage only requires that the infringer acted with
the purpose to profit or gain a commercial advantage, regardless of whether the infringer attained
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be required before ordering a permanent deprivation for civil copyright
infringement, which is a strict liability offense that requires no findings of
willfulness or seriousness.
Moreover, an order to destroy or turn over property that has no
established nexus to the given infringement effectively operates to litigate
future infringement that has not happened. Where future infringement is
a risk based on a current infringement action, the correct avenues include
injunctive relief, to be enforced as needed,195 and even seizing and
destroying the means by which infringement has already occurred. Such
a rule would increase evidentiary burdens and fact-finding, to be sure, but
acts as a safeguard against an otherwise unconstitutional form of relief.
Perhaps the strongest support comes from elsewhere in the copyright
context: newer, corollary provisions in Title 17 of the U.S. Code, which
governs copyright and related rights. In the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA) of 1998,196 for example, the provisions governing seizure
and destruction are so limited. In addition to awarding the usual remedies
of damages, costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, and injunctive relief, a
court “may, as part of a final judgment or decree finding a violation, order
the remedial modification or the destruction of any device or product
involved in the violation” that is in the custody or control of the violator
or that was previously impounded because the court had reasonable cause
to believe that it was involved in a violation.197 The DMCA therefore
articulates a clear nexus requirement.
Similar limitations appear in the provisions governing digital audio
recording devices and media. The anti-circumvention provisions provide
that a court can “order the remedial modification or the destruction of any
digital audio recording device, digital musical recording, or [related
device] that . . . does not comply with, or was involved in a violation of”
the anti-circumvention laws, so long as it is in the custody or control of
the violator or was previously impounded because the court had

either objective. United States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing United States v.
Moore, 604 F.2d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir. 1979)); accord U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CRIMINAL RESOURCE
MANUAL §§ 1850–51 (2020).
195. See, e.g., 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.06[B][2]
(Matthew Bender & Co., rev. ed. 2021) (“It is uncontroversial that a ‘showing of past infringement
and a substantial likelihood of future infringement’ justifies issuance of a permanent
injunction . . . .”).
196. 17 U.S.C. § 1203. The DMCA created new violations to bolster the principal protections of
copyright law in the expanding digital environment. Its substantive provisions prohibit anyone from
providing, distributing, or importing for distribution “copyright management information” that is false
or engaging in the unauthorized removal or alteration of “copyright management information” in
certain circumstances. Id. §§ 1201, 1202.
197. Id. § 1203(b)(6) (emphasis added).
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reasonable cause to believe that it was involved in a violation.198
In sum, allowing the permanent deprivation of all the tools, equipment,
and machinery by which the defendant might commit an infringement
reeks of unconstitutional overbreadth and constitutes a Taking that
violates the Fifth Amendment. The ridiculousness of allowing
deprivations based on hypothetical nexus can be illustrated by imagining
a hypothetical law that forbids one from causing bodily harm to another
by kicking, and provides, as a remedy, that a court can order the kicking
party to deliver up for destruction, say, all red shoes or cowboy boots in
their possession. Such a result, duplicated across our legal system, would
fundamentally challenge our democratic principles.
Civil forfeiture’s mandate of willfulness additionally must apply to the
deprivation remedy. Indeed, the Copyright Act requires willfulness not
only for civil forfeitures but also for enhanced statutory damages that aim
beyond remediation.199 Willfulness requires knowledge of the conduct
constituting infringement, though the courts are split on whether
constructive knowledge or reckless disregard suffices.200 Courts have not
required malice as part of this showing, following the lead of common law
torts that typically view willfulness and maliciousness as independent
showings.201
The Copyright Act does provide that evidence of reproduction or

198. Id. § 1009(g) (emphasis added).
199. Id. § 504(c)(2).
200. See PATRY, supra note 7, § 22:180 (citations omitted). Compare Graper v. Mid-Continent Cas.
Co., 756 F.3d 388, 394 (5th Cir. 2014) (stating that “a finding of willfulness under the Copyright Act
does not require proof of knowing conduct”), and Wildlife Exp. Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18
F.3d 502, 511–12 (7th Cir. 1994) (“In this circuit, our caselaw establishes that a finding of willfulness
is justified ‘if the infringer knows that its conduct is an infringement or if the infringer has acted in
reckless disregard of the copyright owner’s right.’” (quoting Video Views, Inc., v. Studio 21, Ltd.,
925 F.2d 1010, 1020 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 861, (1991))), with Yellow Pages Photos, Inc.
v. Ziplocal, LP, 795 F.3d 1255, 1271 (11th Cir. 2015) (stating that “willfulness under the Copyright
Act ‘means that the defendant “knows his actions constitute an infringement; the actions need not
have been malicious” (quoting Cable/Home Commc’n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829,
851 (11th Cir. 1990))), and Peer Int’l Corp. v. Pausa Recs., Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1335 n.3 (9th Cir.
1990) (Willful, within the meaning of § 504(c)(2), means “with knowledge that the defendant’s
conduct constitutes copyright infringement.” (quoting 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.04 (1989))). See also Robert Aloysius Hyde, A Reckless Disregard of
the Ordinary Infringer? Moving Toward a Balanced and Uniform Standard for Willful Copyright
Infringement, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 377, 378 (2003) (observing that while the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits “define willful infringement somewhat in terms of the common law definition of willfulness,”
other courts have found willful infringement that “encompasses less-blameworthy conduct than
common law willfulness” (footnotes omitted)); Jeffrey M. Thomas, Willful Copyright Infringement:
In Search of a Standard, 65 WASH. L. REV. 903, 903 (1990) (stating that because the 1976 Copyright
Act “does not define the term, determination of the meaning of willfulness is within the province of
judicial interpretation” and has led to inconsistent methods and tests).
201. See PATRY, supra note 7, § 22:180.
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distribution of a copyrighted work, by itself, shall not be sufficient to
establish willful infringement of a copyright.202 To refute evidence of
willful infringement, the party “must not only establish its good faith
belief in the innocence of its conduct, it must also show that it was
reasonable in holding such a belief.”203
Taken together, these two criteria—nexus and willfulness—represent
the bottom floor of any test that will pass constitutional muster. Absent
either one, the civil forfeiture regime veers onto unconstitutional terrain,
and the same must be said for the deprivation remedy, as well.
C.

Comparing Civil Forfeiture Outcomes and Permanent
Deprivations under the Deprivation Remedy

Though required in the civil forfeiture context, neither nexus nor
willfulness has formed a criterion for ordering the deprivation remedy.
The fact that the deprivation remedy has been ordered even against absent,
defaulting defendants further demonstrates that deprivation orders are not
based on either showing. In short, to borrow civil forfeiture parlance, they
are premised neither on the concept of “guilty property” or criminal
conviction.204
In ordering destruction or other disposition of dual-use property as an
infringement remedy, some courts have made clear that they were
ordering the seizure and destruction of dual-use items that had been used,
rather than may be used, in the making of infringing articles.205
Nonetheless, the risk that courts will overstep these bounds remains high

202. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2).
203. Peer Int’l Corp., 909 F.2d at 1336.
204. See, e.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 332–33 (1998) (stating that historic in
rem forfeitures were premised on the concept of “guilty property”).
205. See, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v. Ling, 80 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1244 (D. Colo. 2015) (ordering
infringer “to permanently destroy all of the digital media files relating to, and copies of, Plaintiff’s
copyrighted works made or used by him in violation of Plaintiff’s exclusive rights, as well as all
masters in his possession, custody or control from which such copies may be reproduced”); Nat’l
Broad. Co. v. Sonneborn, 630 F. Supp. 524, 541 (D. Conn. 1985) (granting request for turn-over “with
respect to the copies and master recordings” but declining request as to items that were not infringing);
Cent. Point Software, Inc. v. Nugent, 903 F. Supp. 1057, 1061 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (ordering defendant
to turn over to plaintiffs “all computer hardware and software used to make and distribute unlicensed
or unauthorized copies of the plaintiffs’ copyrighted software,” including but “not limited to, modems,
disk drives, central processing units, and all other articles by means of which such unauthorized or
unlicensed copies were made” (emphasis added)); Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc.
v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854, 866 (N.D. Ga. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 694
F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983) (“The United States Marshal is ORDERED to seize and retain the infringing
materials to be delivered up by defendants, including all copies of the Pamphlet and Booklet, and
plates or matrices used in their printing, currently in defendants’ possession or control.” (emphasis
added)).
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and is poised to go higher. The Second Circuit’s recent refusal to entertain
a studio sound engineer’s challenge to a deprivation order in the Jay-Z
litigation puts more courts on the path to deciding that nexus does not
matter.206 That case also exposed the danger of subjecting dual-use
property to deprivation orders: the sound and recording equipment,
including computers and hard drives, not only were capable of producing
infringing articles—though the sound engineer maintained that they were
not so used—but contained irreplaceable content, including family photos
and videos, that were deeply personal effects and bore no relationship to
the litigation or to copyright infringement at all.207
Further examples implore a nexus requirement. In Hounddog Prods.,
LLC v. Empire Film Group, Inc.,208 the court borrowed verbatim language
from the statute itself in ordering the deprivation of dual-use property. The
plaintiff, which held the copyright in the 2008 motion picture Hounddog,
sued its former film distribution company after terminating a ten-year
exclusive distribution agreement for the promotion and distribution of the
film.209 The plaintiff prevailed on its copyright infringement claim based
on findings that the company, after termination of the agreement,
“continued to promote and distribute Hounddog, including profiting from
sales of Hounddog on DVD, Blu-ray, and Video-on-Demand formats.”210
The court ordered and directed the company not only to deliver all
infringing copies and materials to the plaintiff—which, again, is fine211—
but also to deliver “all plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, film
negatives, or other articles by means of which copies of Hounddog may
be reproduced.”212 This remedy supplemented the award of $150,000 in

206. Mahan v. Roc Nation, LLC, 720 F. App’x 55, 56–57 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting 17 U.S.C.
§ 503(b)); see supra text accompanying notes 15–19.
207. See Mahan, 720 F. App’x at 56 (noting that sound engineer sought return of disks, CDs,
cartridges, computers, hard drives, and an audio player).; Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant
Chauncey Mahan at 3, Mahan v. Roc Nation, LLC, 720 F. App’x 55 (2d Cir. 2018) (No. 16-2791),
2017 WL 1328523, at *2. The likelihood that a deprivation order will reach personal property with
deep personal attachments raises another problem with deprivation orders applied to dual-use
property: their ability to produce lopsided negotiation positions. Given the high costs of litigation,
most copyright infringement cases result in settlements. Parties that wield the risk that a court might
order permanent deprivations of a vast amount of dual-use property—unrelated to the infringement
at issue or at least not significantly linked to the complained-of infringement—obtain a vastly
disproportionate negotiating tool. As a result, the deprivation remedy upsets the parties’ negotiating
positions relative to the actual infringement at issue, and therefore can lead directly to unfair
settlement agreements.
208. 826 F. Supp. 2d 619 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
209. Id. at 625–26.
210. Id. at 626.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 9–11.
212. Hounddog, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 624–25.
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statutory damages for willful infringement, costs and attorney’s fees, and
an injunction against future infringement.213
The litigation concerned a single copyrighted work, which grossed
under $132,000 at the domestic box office and received largely negative
critical reception (rating just 15% on the Tomatometer at
rottentomatoes.com, with somewhat better public reception).214
Moreover, the court entered the order three years after the film’s box
office release, by which time the film’s income stream had substantially
diminished, even considering home-viewing income streams.
The principal difficulty in the court’s order, from a Fifth Amendment
perspective, resides in the turn-over order applicable to “all plates, molds,
matrices, masters, tapes, film negatives, or other articles by means of
which such copies of” the motion picture may be reproduced.215 The
property subject to the order at a film distribution company arguably could
include a sizable amount of equipment, machinery, and materials capable
of non-infringing uses—even property capable of infringing uses but not
so used with respect to the sole copyrighted work. Three years after the
release of an unprofitable film, an order to turn over all equipment and
other dual-use property seems suggestive of a punitive result, especially
when viewed in conjunction with the other remedies also awarded. The
statutory damages alone exceeded the film’s gross profit.
Nor does the tacking-on of deprivation serve the interests of deterrence
or reflect an appropriate harm-penalty correlation. The likelihood that the
infringing party would continue to cause appreciable economic harm by
using the property subject to the turn-over as to the subject work in the
litigation, namely the Hounddog motion picture, appears low. Moreover,
the other available remedies serve that same function, notably the
enforceable injunction against future infringement.216 The value of the
deprivation relative to the litigated infringement seems negligible from a
deterrence standpoint.
On its face, the order neither requires nor establishes an actual nexus
between the infringing conduct and such property. The lack of nexus
213. Id. at 624.
214. Hounddog, ROTTEN TOMATOES, https://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/1195905-hounddog
[https://perma.cc/3G77-2YBA]; see also What Is the Tomatometer?, ROTTEN TOMATOES,
https://www.rottentomatoes.com/about#whatisthetomatometer [https://perma.cc/T2KS-9FJL];
Hounddog,
BOX OFFICE MOJO,
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/release/rl1884849665/
[https://perma.cc/58Z2-U9Z5].
215. 17 U.S.C. § 503(b).
216. Hounddog, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 624 (ordering that defendant is “permanently enjoined from
copying, reproducing, distributing, exhibiting, or performing, or otherwise infringing upon Plaintiffs’
copyrights in, the motion picture entitled Hounddog, and from permitting, authorizing or causing
others to do so”).
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proves fatal to the determination because this same property is not eligible
even for civil forfeiture in the absence of actual nexus. Nonetheless, the
court found willfulness here,217 which provided a basis for supporting the
deprivation remedy if other criteria were also met.
In Graduate Management Admission Council v. Raju,218 the district
court entered a similar order calling for the destruction of dual-use items,
even after the magistrate judge issued a proposed order that would have
limited destruction to property having a close nexus to the litigated
infringement.219 After holding that the foreign, defaulting defendant
infringed on the plaintiff’s copyrights in test forms and questions for the
predominant business school admission exam, the Graduate Management
Admission Test (or GMAT), the district court crafted a remedy that drew
from several civil remedies available in copyright actions: statutory
damages of $3.5 million, costs and attorney’s fees, a permanent injunction
against further infringement, and destruction of infringing test questions
and materials.220 The court additionally ordered the defendant to destroy
“all plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, film negatives, or other
articles by means of which such copies may be reproduced,” violating the
nexus requirement.221 The recommendation of the magistrate judge,
however, had included a proposed order that would have limited
destruction just to “all testing and related materials made by” the
defendant in violation of the plaintiff’s copyrights.222
Nexus, standing alone, is not enough. Even non-willful or innocent
infringement contravenes the Copyright Act because of its strict liability
regime. Making the deprivation remedy available for such
infringements—as the Copyright Act does by not limiting it to willful
infringements—creates substantial constitutionality risks, particularly for
dual-use property. Unlike in the civil forfeiture context, in which property
used in the commission of a crime or proceeds can be forfeited, lack of a
willfulness criterion allows courts to order the permanent deprivation of
property where a nexus exists but where the infringement does not meet
any knowledge or scienter requirement.
For comparison, the Copyright Act provides for statutory damages (in
lieu of actual damages, if selected by the litigant) of $750 to $30,000 per
work for non-willful infringement, but up to $150,000 per work in the

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See id. at 624–25.
267 F. Supp. 2d 505 (E.D. Va. 2003).
Id. at 507–08, 513–14.
Id. at 507–08.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 513.

Carstens (Do Not Delete)

2021]

11/21/21 4:07 PM

COPYRIGHT’S DEPRIVATIONS

1319

case of willful infringement.223 For an infringer who “was not aware and
had no reason to believe that [their] acts constituted an infringement of
copyright,” on the other hand, statutory damages can be reduced as low
as $200.224 The court can remit statutory damages altogether where an
infringer believed that its use was covered by the fair use doctrine.225
These provisions demonstrate legislative intent to shield non-willful
infringers from excessive relief that should apply also to the determination
whether to order the permanent deprivation of personal property.
While the civil forfeiture model provides strong basis for showing the
need for nexus and willfulness, the Copyright Act’s civil forfeiture regime
proves less helpful in resolving concerns over disproportionate property
deprivations. Proportionality has emerged as a restraining force in the
civil forfeiture context. Indeed, the Court clarified in 2019 that
disproportionate civil forfeitures, both state and federal, can run afoul of
the Excessive Fines Clause.226
These proportionality inquiries, however, have two features that make
them inapplicable here. First, historic in rem forfeitures were not viewed
as punitive, and therefore fell outside the mandate of the Excessive Fines
Clause, but these forfeitures evolved as an aberration and a historic
quirk.227 Second, more recent forfeiture cases have characterized civil
forfeitures as punitive.228 This punitive character is what makes the
223. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), (2).
224. Id. § 504(c)(2).
225. Id.
226. Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 682, 690 (2019) (holding that the Excessive Fines
Clause applies to state in rem civil forfeitures through the Fourteenth Amendment and reinforcing
that in rem civil forfeitures in general “are fines for purposes of the Eighth Amendment when they
are at least partially punitive”).
227. But see Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 611 (1993) (“Three kinds of forfeiture were
established in England at the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified in the United States: deodand,
forfeiture upon conviction for a felony or treason, and statutory forfeiture. Each was understood, at
least in part, as imposing punishment.” (citation omitted)). Civil forfeiture historically was confined
to limited categories of cases, including maritime cases such as The Palmyra, in which the Court ruled
that conviction of offenders in personam was not a necessary predicate to the in rem civil forfeiture
action against a pirate ship flying under the flag of Spain. Id.; The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1827);
see also CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 97-139, CRIME AND FORFEITURE 2 (2013) (observing
that statutory civil forfeiture featured prominently in admiralty cases in pre-colonial England and was
used extensively in the American colonies in smuggling cases); Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442,
460–61 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court’s earliest cases involving civil forfeiture
of tools or instrumentalities used in commission of a crime “involved ships that engaged in piracy on
the high seas, in the slave trade, or in the smuggling of cargoes of goods into the United States” and
for which seizure was therefore defensible because under admiralty law “the entire mission of the
ship was unlawful” (footnotes omitted)).
228. See, e.g., Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 689 (“[T]his Court held that civil in rem forfeitures fall within
the Clause’s protection when they are at least partially punitive.”); United States v. Bajakajian, 524
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forfeitures subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.
As Justice Thomas noted in his concurrence in Bennis v. Michigan,229
the forfeiture of property “merely because it was ‘used’ in or was an
‘instrumentality’ of crime has been permitted in England and this country,
both before and after the adoption of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.”230 The two-century history behind civil
forfeitures, however, does not easily translate to other regimes without
that same history to placate originalist theorists.
Even the emphasis on proportionality in the civil forfeiture context is a
relatively recent development and has roughly tracked the widespread
expansion of civil forfeiture regimes during the past few decades.231
Before the resurgence of civil forfeiture in the 1980s, the Court blessed
forfeitures even when the seized property’s offending activity was wholly
out of proportion to its non-offending uses,232 as in the case of a pleasure
yacht that was subject to civil forfeiture (pursuant to laws barring the
transport of controlled substances) despite that only a single marijuana
joint was found on board.233
The proportionality test in the forfeiture test does provide some
important lessons. For example, the extent to which property served noncriminal purposes—or dual-use purposes as corollaries to the dual uses at
issue in the copyright context—does factor into the analysis in evaluating
whether in rem forfeitures are so excessive as to run afoul of the Excessive
Fines Clause. Many jurisdictions have long incorporated the
“instrumentality test”—which requires nexus as a critical threshold and
also looks at willfulness or culpability—into their determinations as to

U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (“We now hold that a punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if
it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.”); Austin, 509 U.S. at 618 (“We
conclude, therefore, that forfeiture generally and statutory in rem forfeiture in particular historically
have been understood, at least in part, as punishment.”).
229. 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
230. Id. at 454 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted). This concurrence nonetheless reflects
Justice Thomas’s discomfort, specifically with his declaration that the use of civil forfeiture against
such property had only historical precedent to recommend it. Id.
231. See Timbs, 139 S. Ct. 682; Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321; Austin, 509 U.S. 602.
232. 22A CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND RIGHTS OF ACCUSED § 611
(2021) (“Even if a civil forfeiture is overwhelmingly disproportionate, it does not constitute
punishment if it serves articulated, legitimate civil purposes such as removing an instrumentality of
crime from general circulation or making the government whole.” (citing Erinkitola v. United States,
901 F. Supp. 80 (N.D.N.Y. 1995))).
233. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 663 (1974). But see Bennis, 516
U.S. at 460–61 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court’s early cases allowing civil forfeiture
of ships were based on admiralty law that called for forfeiture of the entire ship).
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whether a forfeiture of property was constitutionally sound.234 And
whether the property served other legitimate uses also factors into this
analysis. The Fourth Circuit, for example, has expressly stated that the
instrumentality test should consider “whether the purpose of acquiring,
maintaining or using the property was to carry out the offense.”235 Indeed,
the court declared that “[i]n measuring the strength and extent of the nexus
between the property and the offense,” a “court must be able to conclude,
under the totality of circumstances, that the property was a substantial
and meaningful instrumentality in the commission of the offense, or would
have been, had the offensive conduct been carried out as intended.”236
Still, in the forfeiture context, the government not only executes the
forfeitures but also retains forfeited property for its own purposes. The
Excessive Fines Clause also governs forfeitures but will not apply to
property deprivations ordered in civil copyright infringement actions
between private litigants.237
IV. ADDING A PROPORTIONALITY METRIC: DUAL-USE
ITEMS AND THE “SIGNIFICANT OR PREDOMINANT USE”
TEST, APPLYING DE NOVO REVIEW
The need remains for a proportionality metric to evaluate deprivation
orders. In particular, permanent deprivations of personal property should
follow a determination that the infringing uses constitute the significant
or predominant uses, when applied to dual-use property that is also
capable of legitimate, lawful uses. Here, the proportionality metric can be
obtained by a return to the due process guideposts that govern excessive
awards, as well as a requirement that reviewing courts conduct de novo
review where lower courts have imposed the deprivation remedy to dualuse items.

234. In Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, the Supreme Court recognized the basis for this
“instrumentalities” test: “Instrumentalities historically have been treated as a form of ‘guilty property’
that can be forfeited in civil in rem proceedings.” Id. at 333 (emphasis in original). The Bajakajian
Court nonetheless held that the focused inquiry into whether the property was an “instrumentality” in
a crime was not equally applicable in an in personam action. Id. at 333–34.
235. United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[W]e now hold, in determining
excessiveness of an in rem forfeiture under the Eighth Amendment, that a court must apply a threepart instrumentality test that considers (1) the nexus between the offense and the property and the
extent of the property’s role in the offense, (2) the role and culpability of the owner, and (3) the
possibility of separating offending property . . . from the remainder.” (emphasis in original)).
236. Id. (emphasis added).
237. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 264 (1989) (stating that
Excessive Fines Clause does not apply “in a civil suit when the government neither has prosecuted
the action nor has any right to receive a share of the damages awarded”).
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Proportionality via the Three Guideposts

Applying BMW v. Gore’s “three guideposts”238 to protect against
arbitrary awards would help ensure that the deprivation remedy was only
applied where dual-use property was used significantly or predominantly
for infringing uses. With respect to the first guidepost—namely the degree
of reprehensibility—the BMW v. Gore Court observed that “some wrongs
are more blameworthy than others”: “Our holdings that a recidivist may
be punished more severely than a first offender recognize that repeated
misconduct is more reprehensible than an individual instance of
malfeasance.”239 The Court thus identified this first guidepost as
“[p]erhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness” of an
award.240 It continued that economic harms caused by affirmative acts of
misconduct or done to financially vulnerable victims could warrant “a
substantial penalty,” but that economic injuries on their own generally are
not “sufficiently reprehensible to justify a significant sanction in addition
to compensatory damages.”241 The reprehensibility prong can dovetail
with the need to deter particularly blameworthy conduct, such as a
“pattern and practice of fraud, trickery and deceit”242 and “unsavory and
malicious practices.”243
Viewed in the copyright context, certainly reprehensibility can factor
into a court’s decision whether to order the permanent deprivation of dualuse property that is not infringing on its own. The Supreme Court has
suggested that courts give particular consideration to whether the
infringement was a singular or repeated occurrence,244 and this
consideration will be relevant in many copyright infringement actions.
Nonetheless, deprivation orders that fail to account for reprehensibility
pose a heightened risk of unconstitutionality. The government’s primary
interest rests in deterring future infringements, by removing the tools of
infringement and thereby by reducing the opportunity of the infringer to
commit future infringements.245 Like punitive awards, deprivation orders
238. See supra section II.A.1.
239. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore (BMW v. Gore), 517 U.S. 559, 575, 577 (1996) (citing Gryger
v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948)).
240. Id. at 575.
241. Id. at 576.
242. TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453 (1993).
243. Id. at 469 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 187 W. Va.
457, 467 (1992), aff’d, 509 U.S. 443 (1993)).
244. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003).
245. Cf. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemp. Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952) (suggesting that
remedies in civil copyright actions can aim to prevent future infringement, namely by stating that
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arguably serve the government’s legitimate interest in “deterring [the]
repetition” of unlawful conduct, though punitive damages additionally
serve the legitimate interest of punishing unlawful conduct.246
The government has no legitimate interest, however, in permanently
depriving an infringer of dual-use items that were not significantly or
predominantly used to commit the litigated infringement because such
deprivations do not materially advance deterrence. The deterrence effect
disappears where a wholly disproportionate relationship exists between
the litigated infringement and the ordered destruction of the infringer’s
property.
This disconnect is especially true given the range of remedies available
to deter future infringement. One critical distinction from the punitive
damages scenario is that the federal copyright regime already contains an
expansive remedies toolbox for the aggrieved party to achieve more-thanwhole relief.247 As the most obvious example, the Copyright Act allows a
copyright holder to recover the infringer’s disgorged profits on top of
actual damages that compensate the copyright holder for its own
individual losses.248 Unlike with many other civil regimes, a violation of
the copyright laws also can lead to criminal liability.249
This wide variety of remedies—which already go beyond merely
compensating the plaintiff—should make property deprivation a means of
last resort for egregious cases with a high ratio of harm. For example, the
Act also allows for a court to “award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the
prevailing party as part of the costs.”250 Indeed, the Court has expressly
recognized that one of the non-exhaustive factors governing whether a
court should exercise its discretion to award attorney’s fees can include
deterrence.251 The consistency with which courts grant injunctions against
future infringements also shows that other tools are directed at deterring

“discretion of the court is wide enough to permit a resort to statutory damages” in order “to discourage
wrongful conduct”).
246. BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568; accord State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416 (identifying repeated
occurrence as relevant consideration); Cooper Indus. Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S.
424, 432 (2001) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (AM. L. INST. 1979)); Pac. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991).
247. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–505 (providing for various remedies, including injunctions, impounding
and disposition of infringing articles, actual damages, statutory damages, disgorged profits, and costs
and attorney’s fees).
248. Id. § 504(b).
249. Id. § 506.
250. Id. § 505; see also Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 579 U.S. 197, 207–10 (2016)
(clarifying standard and setting out factors for awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing party in
copyright infringement actions).
251. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994).
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infringement. Violation of such an injunction can trigger various
enforcement mechanisms, and likely will spur a finding of willfulness on
any litigation over future infringement.
Even where a risk exists of infringement on a mass scale, other
remedies can often respond to extraordinary cases of infringement to
better deterrent effect. In addition to injunctive relief, statutory damages
can be calculated based on the number of copyright works infringed. In
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.,252 for example, the court found
direct infringement by MP3.com of an estimated 4,700 CDs, and thus
calculated statutory damages of $25,000 per CD, or a total award of
approximately $118 million.253 The court noted that the purpose of the
large award was deterrence because “the potential for huge profits in the
rapidly expanding world of the Internet” was “the lure that tempted an
otherwise generally responsible company like MP3.com to break the law
and that will also tempt others to do so if too low a level is set for the
statutory damages in this case.”254
Tailoring these additional remedies likely will prove more effective at
deterrence than depriving an infringer of dual-use property that has no
connection or only an attenuated connection to the infringement. These
additional remedies will prove especially effective, compared to the
deprivation remedy, where the dual-use property is easily replaceable, as
with a computer or recording equipment. In such a scenario, ordering the
deprivation of computers that could be easily replaced seemingly would
have limited deterrent effect. For this reason, some commentators have
even viewed a permanent deprivation as unnecessary in light of the other
remedies afforded by the Copyright Act.255
Furthermore, the Court made clear both in BMW v. Gore and in State
Farm that the reprehensibility analysis should consider only the conduct
at issue in the litigation and not the potential or actual conduct that occurs
outside the proper confines of the litigation.256 As the Court stated in State
Farm,
252. No. 00CIV.472(JSR), 2000 WL 1262568 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000).
253. Id. at *6.
254. Id. But see Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 462 (2009) (criticizing the award as
“punitive in effect” and thus contrary to policy and purposes of the Copyright Act).
255. See, e.g., MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 9.09[D] (5th ed.
2011) (“In addition, a time-honored variant on the § 503(b) order requiring the destruction of
infringing materials is the ‘turnover’ order, under which the defendant must surrender the articles in
question to the plaintiff. Such orders may raise delicate questions of fairness.”).
256. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore (BMW v. Gore), 517 U.S. 559, 572–74 (1996); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421–22 (2003). In both cases, the Court observed that the
punitive damages took into account the defendant’s conduct outside the respective state’s jurisdiction.
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A defendant should be punished for the conduct that harmed the
plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual or business. Due
process does not permit courts, in the calculation of punitive
damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties’ hypothetical
claims against a defendant under the guise of the reprehensibility
analysis . . . .257
When ordering the deprivation of dual-use items without any findings
of a connection between the property and the litigated infringement,
courts go beyond redressing “conduct that harmed the plaintiff” and create
the implication that the deprivation serves as punishment “for being an
unsavory individual or business.”258
Courts should be particularly wary of treading in these waters because
punitive damages themselves are not available in civil copyright
infringement actions under the Copyright Act.259 Instead, the Copyright
Act provides only for ratcheting up statutory damages awards where the
court finds “that infringement was committed willfully.”260 Sufficiently
reprehensible acts of copyright infringement might warrant a higher
statutory damages award and deprivation of infringing articles to deter
blameworthy conduct. But in those instances, the court applying the first
guidepost should require a showing to that effect, especially where
infringement causes largely economic injuries and where so many
alternative remedies are available.
Application of the second and third guideposts from BMW v. Gore—
the disparity between the actual or potential harm and the award, as well
257. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423.
258. Id.
259. PATRY, supra note 7, § 22:151 (stating that “[p]unitive damages are never available for
copyright infringement actions brought under the 1976 Copyright Act” (emphasis in original)). Patry
states that some courts have been led astray on this point by the availability of enhanced statutory
damages for willful infringement. Id.; see, e.g., On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir.
2001) (stating that the “purpose of punitive damages—to punish and prevent malicious conduct—is
generally achieved under the Copyright Act” through statutory damages provisions that “allow
increases to an award of statutory damages in cases of willful infringement”). Parties can sometimes
obtain punitive damages based on common law copyright claims that are not pre-empted by the
Copyright Act. For example, the Copyright Act did not protect sound recordings prior to 1972, so
parties have obtained punitive damages for infringement of pre-1972 sound recordings pursuant to
state-based common law copyright claims. See, e.g., EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc. v. MP3tunes,
LLC, 844 F.3d 79, 85, 101 (2d Cir. 2016) (upholding $750,000 punitive damages award for common
law copyright claim against online “locker service for storing digital music” that infringed copyrights
in thousands of sound recordings and musical compositions, including pre-1972 sound recordings).
260. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2); see also Pamela Samuelson, Opening Statement, The Unconstitutional
Excessiveness of Some Statutory Damage Awards in Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing Copyright Cases, 158
U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 53, 56 (2009) (arguing that some statutory damage awards, especially
those in file-sharing cases, should be struck down as unconstitutionally excessive and maintaining
that BMW v. Gore’s guideposts are not applicable to such determinations based on statutory language
providing “notice” for such awards).
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as the difference between the remedy and comparable civil penalties261—
highlights the additional risk of a due process violation, particularly given
the full panoply of civil remedies available. “The second and perhaps most
commonly cited indicium of an unreasonable or excessive punitive
damages award” examines the “ratio [of] the actual harm inflicted on the
plaintiff.”262 While often expressed as a single-multiplier rule, the Court
left the door open to larger awards where particularly egregious acts result
in only small economic damages—consider instances of unabashed
trespass onto private property as in Jacque v. Steenberg Homes,263 for
example, or the classic example of a party who “wildly fires a gun into a
crowd” but damages only a ten-dollar pair of glasses.264
The Court in BMW v. Gore also did not rule out larger awards for
difficult-to-detect or difficult-to-calculate harms.265 But the Copyright Act
provides mechanisms for both scenarios, particularly in its statutory
damages remedy.266 As early as 1935, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that the Copyright Act’s statutory damages were adopted “to give the
owner of a copyright some recompense for injury done him, in a case
where the rules of law render difficult or impossible proof of damages or
discovery of profits.”267
The third guidepost—which focuses on the differential between the
subject case and comparable cases—lurks somewhat in the shadows
behind the first and second (which the Court characterizes for their
importance and popularity, respectively). In an early case, the Court
explained that it was “not prepared to enshrine” a comparative test as the
governing analytical approach because “no two cases are truly identical,
[so that] meaningful comparisons of such awards are difficult to make.”268
Part of this inquiry, however, calls for considering the availability of other
relief that has proven effective at serving the government’s interest in

261. BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574–75.
262. Id. at 580.
263. 563 N.W.2d 154 (1997).
264. TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 459 (1993) (quoting Garnes v. Fleming
Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va., 656, 661 (1991)). In his influential article, Professor Morris presents the
shotgun-glasses hypothetical and declares that “[t]he admonition meted out to him should be the same
as though he had killed or injured someone.” Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1181 (1931).
265. BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. at 582.
266. The plaintiff must elect between actual damages and statutory damages. 17 U.S.C.
§ 504(c)(1); see, e.g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 343 (1998) (stating
that the Copyright Act afforded plaintiff opportunity “to recover ‘Statutory Damages’ in lieu of actual
damages”).
267. Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207, 209 (1935).
268. TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 457–58.
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incentivizing deterrence.269
Application of the three guideposts therefore disfavors deprivation as a
remedy in the civil copyright context, where ordered in the absence of
critical showings that might warrant the permanent deprivation of
personal property. The copyright holder already is entitled to
restitutionary recovery that permits it to obtain compensation for its own
injuries and obtain all additional gains achieved by the infringer. The
Copyright Act includes a few other isolated examples, such as requiring
an infringer without a good-faith belief in fair use “an additional award of
two times the amount of the license fee that the proprietor of the
establishment concerned should have paid the plaintiff for such use during
the preceding period of up to 3 years.”270
Again, though, neither the statute nor the courts have instituted a
threshold for ordering the deprivation remedy that would ensure that it
does not stray into BMW v. Gore’s “zone of arbitrariness.”271 The
Hounddog litigation, discussed above,272 highlights this proportionality
gap, even where nexus and willfulness are shown. The court required no
showing as to how the film distribution company used any of the
company’s existing equipment to commit infringement of the Hounddog
film. The government’s legitimate interests in deterrence are not served if
that equipment was predominantly or substantially put to other uses.
Furthermore, the other remedies already exceeded even the film’s entire
domestic box office returns.273
The motion picture was, to put it bluntly, a flop that reflected minimal
risk that future infringement could cause substantial harm. Under these
circumstances, the property deprivation seems to cross the due process
boundary into the “zone of arbitrariness” that concerned the Court in
BMW v. Gore.274
It also bears repeating that copyright law is a strict liability regime, and
269. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp. Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 438–39 (2001) (citing, inter
alia, A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 869, 890–91 (1998) and Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages
and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1449 (1993)).
270. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(d) (applying to proprietor who does not have good-faith belief that actions
comported with so-called homestyle exception or small business exemption, set out in 17 U.S.C.
§ 110(5), which allow business owners and other individuals to publicly display or transmit
performances within their establishments, provided that their businesses were less than a certain size
or used the kinds of transmission equipment that are typical for use in homes).
271. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore (BMW v. Gore), 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
272. See supra text accompanying notes 208–214.
273. Hounddog Prods., LLC v. Empire Film Grp., Inc., 826 F. Supp. 2d 619, 624–25 (2011);
Hounddog, BOX OFFICE MOJO, https://www.boxofficemojo.com/release/rl1884849665/ [https://per
ma.cc/58Z2-U9Z5].
274. BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568 (citations omitted).
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the deprivation remedy is available in a civil copyright action even for
non-willful infringement and small-scale infringement. Where copyright
law aims at willful infringement or criminality, it does so expressly
through other remedies, such as enhanced statutory damages for
exceptional cases of willful infringement275 and through separate
provisions for criminal infringement. When ordered in addition to other
remedies, the destruction or turn-over of dual-use property that was not a
significant or predominant tool for the infringement (as found by the
court) exceeds what is necessary to compensate a copyright holder or to
deter infringement, and thus it seems just that: punitive.
More generally, the public interest is not served by depriving infringers
of dual-use property that was not significantly or predominantly used to
commit the litigated infringement. Destroying or otherwise depriving a
party of property used primarily for non-infringing uses impedes the
copyright law’s underlying policy of stimulating creative expression276
because it dampens the lawful use and accessibility of creative works. Our
Constitution itself provides for copyright protection as a means of
promoting the progress of the arts and sciences.277
B.

Proportionality Reviewed: The De Novo Standard of Appellate
Review

As further protection against arbitrary or excessive awards, reviewing
courts should ensure that they are applying the de novo standard of review,
and not an abuse of discretion standard. Courts already have reasons to
tailor deprivation orders more narrowly than an order that could
potentially violate the Due Process or Takings Clauses. They are bound
to conduct a four-factor test in deciding whether to order impoundment,
for example, sometimes a precursor to destruction.278
And in less serious cases, courts have held that ordering destruction or
other disposition of dual-use items is simply not warranted.279 These cases
275. See, e.g., Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 254, at 446 (stating that the courts have found
“willful[ness]” to support enhanced statutory damages in an “increasing number of awards that are
not only punitive in effect, but punitive in intent” and thus “inconsistent with sound copyright policy
and with Congress’s intent in adopting [the statutory damages] provision”).
276. See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 517–18 (1994) (“[T]he Copyright Act’s
primary objective is to encourage the production of original literary, artistic, and musical expression
for the public good . . . . [C]opyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public
through access to creative works . . . .”).
277. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
278. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b), (f).
279. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1259 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (denying request for seizure because the “equipment is hardly an instrument of infringement”
but “is essential to the operation of his business and other affairs”).
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show that just as the drafters of the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts
predicted, some judges are circumspect and have considered whether the
dual-use property was substantially or predominantly used for the litigated
infringement.280 For example, courts have denied requests for seizure,
destruction, or other disposition of dual-use items because they are
capable of or primarily used for non-infringing purposes.281 Other courts
have made clear that they closely consider the non-infringing uses,
including whether destruction would “deprive the defendant of legitimate
use of the items in question,”282 even where they ultimately decide to order
destruction or other disposition on the facts of the case.
Not all courts toe this line, though, as shown in cases like Mahan v. Roc
Nation, LLC.283 In Mahan, the Second Circuit not only held that the
Copyright Act required no showings that the property had been used to
infringing ends at all, much less that the infringing uses were the
significant or predominant uses relative to the litigated infringement.284
Yet the Second Circuit made another error in applying an “abuse of
discretion” standard. It cited the landmark case of Rogers v. Koons285—in
which artist Jeff Koons was required to turn over his infringing sculptural
works that were based on the copyrighted image presented on a tourist
postcard286—to argue that it was only required to review deprivation
orders pursuant to Section 503(b) using an abuse of discretion standard.287
In Rogers, though, the district court had ordered the deprivation of
infringing copies themselves, not dual-use property that was subject to
deprivation based on the use to which an infringer might put it.
These two categories of property subject to deprivation orders are
fundamentally different.288 The “abuse of discretion” standard might well
280. See, e.g., Love v. Kwitny, 772 F. Supp. 1367, 1374–75 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 963 F.2d 1521
(2d Cir. 1992) (denying plaintiff’s request for “‘reasonable disposition’ of existing copies and ‘articles
by means of which such copies . . . may be reproduced,’ pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 503(b)” because
protected work “does not appear now to be a hot item”).
281. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr., 923 F. Supp. at 1259 (denying plaintiff’s request for
defendant’s computer and other equipment because it was “hardly an instrument of infringement” but
rather “is essential to the operation of his business and other affairs”); RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys.,
Inc., 594 F. Supp. 335, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (denying copyright holder’s request for seizure of
equipment because it “would thus prevent the legitimate and socially beneficent uses of the Rezound
machine”).
282. Hounddog Prods., LLC v. Empire Film Grp., Inc., 826 F. Supp. 2d 619, 633–34 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (citations omitted).
283. 720 F. App’x 55, 57 (2d Cir. 2018).
284. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 17–22.
285. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
286. Id. at 313.
287. Mahan, 720 F. App’x at 57.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 9–16.
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be appropriate when applied to deprivation orders applied to infringing
articles themselves. Certainly the core finding of nexus exists by its very
nature.
The more demanding de novo standard, however, should apply to
deprivation orders applied to dual-use property, following the rule of
Cooper.289 There, the Court recognized that de novo review helps to
protect against orders that veer dangerously into the territory of
excessiveness. It noted that although district courts “have a somewhat
superior vantage over courts of appeals” in assessing reprehensibility, the
appellate courts are equally capable or more suited to analyzing the harmpenalty correlation and whether the penalty accords with those in
comparable cases.290
The fact that some courts have exercised appropriate discretion in
deciding whether to order property deprivations does not excuse other,
constitutionally problematic deprivations. Instead, deprivation orders
applied to dual-use property call for a searching review greater than that
provided by the “abuse of discretion” standard that the Second Circuit
applied in Mahan.291 Regardless of how the court might have found if
applying de novo review, the absence of the inquiry makes the violation.
CONCLUSION
The current deprivation remedy can result in the permanent deprivation
of personal property in violation of the Due Process Clause and Takings
Clause. The tipping point occurs where the statutory language allows the
mere capacity of these items for infringing uses to override any
requirements of actual nexus, willfulness, or proportionality.
A comparison to the Copyright Act’s civil forfeiture provisions
illustrates why such deprivations should not occur absent findings of
actual nexus to the infringement and willfulness. Yet actual nexus and
willfulness, standing alone, are not enough to steer clear of a
constitutional violation. The Due Process Clause additionally demands
that the infringing uses must constitute the significant or predominant uses
and that reviewing courts subject deprivation orders of non-infringing
property to de novo review.
A court order that deprives an infringing party of property that could
be used for future infringement reflects understandable logic and allure: it
prevents the recurrence of infringement in what can sometimes emerge as
a whack-a-mole approach to copyright enforcement, especially when
289. Cooper Indus. Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 435–40 (2001).
290. Id. at 440.
291. Mahan, 720 F. App’x at 57; see supra text accompanying notes 17–23.
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pursuing unscrupulous infringers who demonstrate a propensity to
commit repeat or large-scale copyright violations. But the impulse to
remove the tools of infringement, however understandable, cannot justify
permanent deprivation of dual-use items that only may be used to
reproduce an infringing copy, regardless of whether they have been so
used and regardless of whether the circumstances of the case are serious
enough to warrant it.
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